-
101Internalism, Externalism, and the KK PrincipleErkenntnis 86 (6): 1-20. 2019.This paper examines the relationship between the KK principle and the epistemological theses of externalism and internalism. In particular we examine arguments from Okasha :80–86, 2013) and Greco :169–197, 2014) which deny that we can derive the denial of the KK principle from externalism.
-
94The aim of belief and the aim of scienceTheoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2): 171. 2019.I argue that the constitutive aim of belief and the constitutive aim of science are both knowledge. The ‘aim of belief’, understood as the correctness conditions of belief, is to be identified with the product of properly functioning cognitive systems. Science is an institution that is the social functional analogue of a cognitive system, and its aim is the same as that of belief. In both cases it is knowledge rather than true belief that is the product of proper functioning.
-
186Understanding the replication crisis as a base rate fallacyBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 000-000. 2018.
-
281Against CreativityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3): 694-713. 2019.Creativity is typically defined as a disposition to produce valuable ideas. We argue that this is a mistake and defend a new definition of creativity in terms of the imagination. It follows that creativity has instrumental value at most and then only in the right circumstances. We consider the role of tradition and judgment in worthwhile creativity and argue that there is frequently a tension between greater creativity and the production of value.
-
134I—Fundamental Powers, Evolved Powers, and Mental PowersAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1): 247-275. 2018.Powers have in recent years become a central component of many philosophers’ ontology of properties. While I have argued that powers exist at the fundamental level of properties, many other theorists of powers hold that there are also non-fundamental powers. In this paper I articulate my reasons for being sceptical about the existing reasons for holding that there are non-fundamental powers. However, I also want to promote a different argument for the existence of a certain class of non-fundamen…Read more
-
235What can cognitive science tell us about scientific revolutions?Theoria 27 (3): 293-321. 2012.Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which it drew on the results of cognitive psychology. These naturalistic elements were not well received and Kuhn did not subsequently develop them in his pub- lished work. Nonetheless, in a philosophical climate more receptive to naturalism, we are able to give a more positive evaluation of Kuhn’s proposals. Recently, philosophers such as Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen, Barker, and Chen have used the results of work on …Read more
-
33Antidotes all the way down?Theoria 19 (3): 259-269. 2010.This paper explores the question: can fundamental dispositions suffer from finks and antidotes? I use my response to shed light on the question: can the fundamental laws of physics be ceteris paribus laws?
-
20Philosophy of Science a Unified Approach, written by Gerhard SchurzGrazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4): 638-640. 2017._ Source: _Page Count 5
-
70Review of Philosophy of Science a Unified Approach, by Gerhard Schurz (review)Grazer Philosophische Studien. forthcoming.Review of Gerhard Schurz's Philosophy of Science - A Unified Approach. Routledge, Abingdon 2014
-
204Evidence and InferencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2): 299-317. 2018.I articulate a functional characterisation of the concept of evidence, according to which evidence is that which allows us to make inferences that extend our knowledge. This entails Williamson's equation of knowledge with evidence.
-
60Systematicity, knowledge, and bias. How systematicity made clinical medicine a scienceSynthese 196 (3): 863-879. 2019.This paper shows that the history of clinical medicine in the eighteenth century supports Paul Hoyningen-Huene’s thesis that there is a correlation between science and systematicity. For example, James Jurin’s assessment of the safety of variolation as a protection against smallpox adopted a systematic approach to the assessment of interventions in order to eliminate sources of cognitive bias that would compromise inquiry. Clinical medicine thereby became a science. I use this confirming instanc…Read more
-
8Review of Craig Dilworth: The Metaphysics of Science (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2): 284-286. 1997.
-
9Further Antidotes: a Response to GundersenPhilosophical Quarterly 50 (199): 229-233. 2000.In my ‘Dispositions and Antidotes’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48, I raise an objection to the conditional analysis of dispositions, both in its simple formulation and in a more sophisticated version due to David Lewis, The Philosophical Quarterly, 47. The objection suggests that a disposition may be continuously present and the appropriate stimulus occur without the manifestation occurring, because some outside influence, an antidote, interferes. Gundersen in The Philosophical Quarterly, 50, …Read more
-
209Scientific progress as accumulation of knowledge: a reply to RowbottomStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2): 279-281. 2008.I defend my view that scientific progress is constituted by the accumulation of knowledge against a challenge from Rowbottom in favour of the semantic view that it is only truth that is relevant to progress.Keywords: Scientific progress; Knowledge; Aim of inquiry; Darrell Rowbottom.
-
30
-
75IntroductionSynthese 149 (3): 445-450. 2006.This volume contains essays by five British philosophers and one Swedish philosopher working in metaphysics and in particular metaphysics as it relates to the philosophy of science. These philosophers are the core of a tight network of European philosophers of science and metaphysicians and their essays have evolved as a result of workshops in Lund, Edinburgh, and Athens.
-
85Fred Gifford (ed.): Philosophy of Medicine (review)Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (1): 53-57. 2013.
-
135The epistemological argument against Lewis’s regularity view of lawsPhilosophical Studies 138 (1): 73-89. 2008.I argue for the claim that if Lewis’s regularity theory of laws were true, we could not know any positive law statement to be true. Premise 1: According to that theory, for any law statement true of the actual world, there is always a nearby world where the law statement is false (a world that differs with respect to one matter of particular fact). Premise 2: One cannot know a proposition to be true if it is false in a nearby world (the epistemological safety principle). The conclusion that no l…Read more
-
197Structural properties revisitedIn Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes, Clarendon Press. pp. 215--41. 2009.Those who hold that all fundamental sparse properties have dispositional essences face a problem with structural (e.g. geometrical) properties. In this paper I consider a further route for the dispositional monist that is enabled by the requirement that physical theories should be background-free. If this requirement is respected then we can see how spatial displacement can be a causally active relation and hence may be understood dispositionally.
-
415Explanation and lawsSynthese 120 (1): 1--18. 1999.In this paper I examine two aspects of Hempel’s covering-law models of explanation. These are (i) nomic subsumption and (ii) explication by models. Nomic subsumption is the idea that to explain a fact is to show how it falls under some appropriate law. This conception of explanation Hempel explicates using a pair of models, where, in this context, a model is a template or pattern such that if something fits it, then that thing is an explanation. A range of well-known counter-examples to Hempel’s …Read more
-
231Causation and the manifestation of powersIn Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations, Routledge. 2010.It is widely agreed that many causal relations can be regarded as dependent upon causal relations that are in some way more basic. For example, knocking down the first domino in a row of one hundred dominoes will be the cause of the hundredth domino falling. But this causal relation exists in virtue of the knocking of the first domino causing the falling of the second domino, and so forth. In such a case, A causes B in virtue of there being intermediate events I1 . . . In such that A causes I1, …Read more
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Natural Sciences |
General Philosophy of Science |
PhilPapers Editorships
Natural Kinds |