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91Internalism, Externalism, and the KK PrincipleErkenntnis 86 (6): 1-20. 2019.This paper examines the relationship between the KK principle and the epistemological theses of externalism and internalism. In particular we examine arguments from Okasha :80–86, 2013) and Greco :169–197, 2014) which deny that we can derive the denial of the KK principle from externalism.
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85The aim of belief and the aim of scienceTheoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2): 171. 2019.I argue that the constitutive aim of belief and the constitutive aim of science are both knowledge. The ‘aim of belief’, understood as the correctness conditions of belief, is to be identified with the product of properly functioning cognitive systems. Science is an institution that is the social functional analogue of a cognitive system, and its aim is the same as that of belief. In both cases it is knowledge rather than true belief that is the product of proper functioning.
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182Understanding the replication crisis as a base rate fallacyBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 000-000. 2018.
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271Against CreativityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3): 694-713. 2019.Creativity is typically defined as a disposition to produce valuable ideas. We argue that this is a mistake and defend a new definition of creativity in terms of the imagination. It follows that creativity has instrumental value at most and then only in the right circumstances. We consider the role of tradition and judgment in worthwhile creativity and argue that there is frequently a tension between greater creativity and the production of value.
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126I—Fundamental Powers, Evolved Powers, and Mental PowersAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1): 247-275. 2018.Powers have in recent years become a central component of many philosophers’ ontology of properties. While I have argued that powers exist at the fundamental level of properties, many other theorists of powers hold that there are also non-fundamental powers. In this paper I articulate my reasons for being sceptical about the existing reasons for holding that there are non-fundamental powers. However, I also want to promote a different argument for the existence of a certain class of non-fundamen…Read more
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224What can cognitive science tell us about scientific revolutions?Theoria 27 (3): 293-321. 2012.Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which it drew on the results of cognitive psychology. These naturalistic elements were not well received and Kuhn did not subsequently develop them in his pub- lished work. Nonetheless, in a philosophical climate more receptive to naturalism, we are able to give a more positive evaluation of Kuhn’s proposals. Recently, philosophers such as Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen, Barker, and Chen have used the results of work on …Read more
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31Antidotes all the way down?Theoria 19 (3): 259-269. 2010.This paper explores the question: can fundamental dispositions suffer from finks and antidotes? I use my response to shed light on the question: can the fundamental laws of physics be ceteris paribus laws?
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17Philosophy of Science a Unified Approach, written by Gerhard SchurzGrazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4): 638-640. 2017._ Source: _Page Count 5
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44Review of Philosophy of Science a Unified Approach, by Gerhard Schurz (review)Grazer Philosophische Studien. forthcoming.Review of Gerhard Schurz's Philosophy of Science - A Unified Approach. Routledge, Abingdon 2014
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197Evidence and InferencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2): 299-317. 2018.I articulate a functional characterisation of the concept of evidence, according to which evidence is that which allows us to make inferences that extend our knowledge. This entails Williamson's equation of knowledge with evidence.
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52Systematicity, knowledge, and bias. How systematicity made clinical medicine a scienceSynthese 196 (3): 863-879. 2019.This paper shows that the history of clinical medicine in the eighteenth century supports Paul Hoyningen-Huene’s thesis that there is a correlation between science and systematicity. For example, James Jurin’s assessment of the safety of variolation as a protection against smallpox adopted a systematic approach to the assessment of interventions in order to eliminate sources of cognitive bias that would compromise inquiry. Clinical medicine thereby became a science. I use this confirming instanc…Read more
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7Review of Craig Dilworth: The Metaphysics of Science (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2): 284-286. 1997.
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9Further Antidotes: a Response to GundersenPhilosophical Quarterly 50 (199): 229-233. 2000.In my ‘Dispositions and Antidotes’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48, I raise an objection to the conditional analysis of dispositions, both in its simple formulation and in a more sophisticated version due to David Lewis, The Philosophical Quarterly, 47. The objection suggests that a disposition may be continuously present and the appropriate stimulus occur without the manifestation occurring, because some outside influence, an antidote, interferes. Gundersen in The Philosophical Quarterly, 50, …Read more
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205Scientific progress as accumulation of knowledge: a reply to RowbottomStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2): 279-281. 2008.I defend my view that scientific progress is constituted by the accumulation of knowledge against a challenge from Rowbottom in favour of the semantic view that it is only truth that is relevant to progress.Keywords: Scientific progress; Knowledge; Aim of inquiry; Darrell Rowbottom.
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68IntroductionSynthese 149 (3): 445-450. 2006.This volume contains essays by five British philosophers and one Swedish philosopher working in metaphysics and in particular metaphysics as it relates to the philosophy of science. These philosophers are the core of a tight network of European philosophers of science and metaphysicians and their essays have evolved as a result of workshops in Lund, Edinburgh, and Athens.
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80Fred Gifford (ed.): Philosophy of Medicine (review)Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (1): 53-57. 2013.
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297Social knowing: The social sense of 'scientific knowledge'Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 23-56. 2010.There is a social or collective sense of ‘knowledge’, as used, for example, in the phrase ‘the growth of scientific knowledge’. In this paper I show that social knowledge does not supervene on facts about what individuals know, nor even what they believe or intend, or any combination of these or other mental states. Instead I develop the idea that social knowing is an analogue to individual knowing, where the analogy focuses on the functional role of social and individual knowing.
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96David Armstrong, Charlie Martin, and Ullin place, edited by Tim Crane dispositions: A debate; Stephen Mumford dispositionsBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1): 137-149. 2001.
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25Review of Stephen Mumford, David Armstrong (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5). 2008.
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233A Posteriori Knowledge of Natural Kind EssencesPhilosophical Topics 35 (1-2): 293-312. 2007.I defend this claim that some natural essences can be known (only) a pos- teriori against two philosophers who accept essentialism but who hold that essences are known a priori: Joseph LaPorte, who argues from the use of kind terms in science, and E. J. Lowe, who argues from general metaphysical and epistemological principles
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223Unexpected a posteriori necessary laws of natureAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4). 2005.In this paper I argue that it is not a priori that all the laws of nature are contingent. I assume that the fundamental laws are contingent and show that some non-trivial, a posteriori, non-basic laws may nonetheless be necessary in the sense of having no counterinstances in any possible world. I consider a law LS (such as 'salt dissolves in water') that concerns a substance S. Kripke's arguments concerning constitution show that the existence of S requires that a certain deeper level law or var…Read more
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125Kuhn on reference and essencePhilosophia Scientiae 8 (1): 39-71. 2004.Kuhn's incommensurability thesis seems to challenge scientific realism. One response to that challenge is to focus on the continuity of reference. The casual theory of reference in particular seems to offer the possibility of continuity of reference that woud provide a basis for the sort of comparability between theories that the realist requires. In "Dubbing and Redubbing: the vulnerability of rigid designation" Kuhn attacks the causal theory and the essentialism to which is is related. Kuhn's …Read more
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