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13Kuhn on Reference and EssencePhilosophia Scientiae 8 39-71. 2004.La thèse kuhnienne de l’incommensurabilité semble mettre en cause le réalisme scientifique. Une réponse à cette mise en cause consiste à se focaliser sur la continuité de la référence. La théorie causale de la référence, en particulier, semble offrir la possibilité d’une continuité de la référence susceptible de fournir une base pour l’espèce de comparabilité entre théories que requiert le réaliste. Dans « baptiser et rebaptiser : la vulnérabilité des désignations rigides », Kuhn attaque la théo…Read more
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83… And Then Again, He Might Not BeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3): 517-521. 2009.In reply to Michael Bertrand, I clarify my view that the problem of physical evil is not an a priori problem but an a posteriori one
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44The philosophy of history of science of Thomas KuhnDiscusiones Filosóficas 13 (21). 2012.Int his article, I argue that Kuhn was a historicist in two respects. First, he was a conservative in Mannheim’s sense—tradition is important for understanding scientific change, and the evaluation of a scientific idea is relative to historical context. Secondly, Kuhn embraced determinism—there is a pattern to scientific change, akin to laws of scientific development. I show that Kuhn’s determinism requires that he is an internalist about the causes of scientific change; Kuhn’s internal- ism con…Read more
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413Kuhn and Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth CenturyAnnals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 12 (2): 61-74. 2004.Thomas Kuhn was undoubtedly the strongest influence on the philosophy of science in the last third of the twentieth century. Yet today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century it is unclear what his legacy really is. In the philosophy of science there is no characteristically Kuhnian school. This could be because we are all Kuhnians now. But it might also be because Kuhn’s thought, although revolutionary in its time, has since been superseded. In a sense both may be true. We are all Coperni…Read more
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75The historical turn in the philosophy of scienceIn Stathis Psillos & Martin Curd (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Routledge. pp. 67--77. 2008.
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387Overpowering: How the Powers Ontology Has Overreached ItselfMind 125 (498): 341-383. 2016.Many authors have argued in favour of an ontology of properties as powers, and it has been widely argued that this ontology allows us to address certain philosophical problems in novel and illuminating ways, for example, causation, representation, intentionality, free will and liberty. I argue that the ontology of powers, even if successful as an account of fundamental natural properties, does not provide the insight claimed as regards the aforementioned non-fundamental phenomena. I illustrate t…Read more
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486Essences and natural kindsIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. pp. 497--506. 2009.Essentialism as applied to individuals is the claim that for at least some individuals there are properties that those individuals possess essentially. What it is to possess a property essentially is a matter of debate. To possess a property essentially is often taken to be akin to possessing a property necessarily, but stronger, although this is not a feature of Aristotle’s essentialism, according to which essential properties are those thing could not lose without ceasing to exist. Kit Fine (1…Read more
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