•  217
    I—Fundamental Powers, Evolved Powers, and Mental Powers
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1): 247-275. 2018.
    Powers have in recent years become a central component of many philosophers’ ontology of properties. While I have argued that powers exist at the fundamental level of properties, many other theorists of powers hold that there are also non-fundamental powers. In this paper I articulate my reasons for being sceptical about the existing reasons for holding that there are non-fundamental powers. However, I also want to promote a different argument for the existence of a certain class of non-fundamen…Read more
  •  425
    Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which it drew on the results of cognitive psychology. These naturalistic elements were not well received and Kuhn did not subsequently develop them in his pub- lished work. Nonetheless, in a philosophical climate more receptive to naturalism, we are able to give a more positive evaluation of Kuhn’s proposals. Recently, philosophers such as Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen, Barker, and Chen have used the results of work on …Read more
  •  145
    Antidotes all the way down?
    Theoria 19 (3): 259-269. 2010.
    This paper explores the question: can fundamental dispositions suffer from finks and antidotes? I use my response to shed light on the question: can the fundamental laws of physics be ceteris paribus laws?
  •  589
    Review of Philosophy of Science a Unified Approach, by Gerhard Schurz
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4): 638-640. 2017.
    Review of Gerhard Schurz's Philosophy of Science - A Unified Approach. Routledge, Abingdon 2014.
  •  751
    V *-naturalizing Kuhn
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1): 99-117. 2004.
    I argue that the naturalism of Thomas Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions," which he himself later ignored, is worthy of rehabilitation. A naturalistic conception of paradigms is ripe for development with the tools of cognitive science. As a consequence a naturalistic understanding of world-change and incommensurability is also viable.
  •  119
    Understanding disease and illness
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 38 (4): 239-244. 2017.
  •  268
    Evidence and Inference
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2): 299-317. 2018.
    I articulate a functional characterisation of the concept of evidence, according to which evidence is that which allows us to make inferences that extend our knowledge. This entails Williamson's equation of knowledge with evidence.
  •  113
    This paper shows that the history of clinical medicine in the eighteenth century supports Paul Hoyningen-Huene’s thesis that there is a correlation between science and systematicity. For example, James Jurin’s assessment of the safety of variolation as a protection against smallpox adopted a systematic approach to the assessment of interventions in order to eliminate sources of cognitive bias that would compromise inquiry. Clinical medicine thereby became a science. I use this confirming instanc…Read more
  •  337
    Scientific progress as accumulation of knowledge: a reply to Rowbottom
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2): 279-281. 2008.
    I defend my view that scientific progress is constituted by the accumulation of knowledge against a challenge from Rowbottom in favour of the semantic view that it is only truth that is relevant to progress.Keywords: Scientific progress; Knowledge; Aim of inquiry; Darrell Rowbottom.
  •  136
    Introduction
    Synthese 149 (3): 445-450. 2006.
    This volume contains essays by five British philosophers and one Swedish philosopher working in metaphysics and in particular metaphysics as it relates to the philosophy of science. These philosophers are the core of a tight network of European philosophers of science and metaphysicians and their essays have evolved as a result of workshops in Lund, Edinburgh, and Athens.
  •  144
    Fred Gifford (ed.): Philosophy of Medicine (review)
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (1): 53-57. 2013.
  •  47
    Review (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2): 149-151. 1997.
  •  344
    Unexpected a posteriori necessary laws of nature
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4). 2005.
    In this paper I argue that it is not a priori that all the laws of nature are contingent. I assume that the fundamental laws are contingent and show that some non-trivial, a posteriori, non-basic laws may nonetheless be necessary in the sense of having no counterinstances in any possible world. I consider a law LS (such as 'salt dissolves in water') that concerns a substance S. Kripke's arguments concerning constitution show that the existence of S requires that a certain deeper level law or var…Read more
  •  168
    Inductive knowledge
    In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. 2011.
    The first obstacle that confronts the student of induction is that of defining the subject matter. One initial point is to note that much of the relevant subject matter goes under the description ‘the theory of confirmation’. The distinction is primarily that the study of induction concerns inference, i.e. cases where one takes the conclusion to be established by the evidence, whereas confirmation concerns the weight of evidence, which one may take to be something like the credibility of a hypot…Read more
  •  74
    Oof!
    Foundations of Science 152 1-18. 2004.
  •  166
    The logic in logicism
    Dialogue 36 (2): 341--60. 1997.
    Frege's logicism consists of two theses: the truths of arithmetic are truths of logic; the natural numbers are objects. In this paper I pose the question: what conception of logic is required to defend these theses? I hold that there exists an appropriate and natural conception of logic in virtue of which Hume's principle is a logical truth. Hume's principle, which states that the number of Fs is the number of Gs iff the concepts F and G are equinumerous is the central plank in the neo-logicist …Read more
  •  368
    Eliminative abduction: examples from medicine
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4): 345-352. 2010.
    Peter Lipton argues that inference to the best explanation involves the selection of a hypothesis on the basis of its loveliness. I argue that in optimal cases of IBE we may be able to eliminate all but one of the hypotheses. In such cases we have a form of eliminative induction takes place, which I call ‘Holmesian inference’. I argue that Lipton’s example in which Ignaz Semmelweis identified a cause of puerperal fever better illustrates Holmesian inference than Liptonian IBE. I consider in deta…Read more
  •  563
    The dispositionalist conception of laws
    Foundations of Science 10 (4): 353-70. 2005.
    This paper sketches a dispositionalist conception of laws and shows how the dispositionalist should respond to certain objections. The view that properties are essentially dispositional is able to provide an account of laws that avoids the problems that face the two views of laws (the regularity and the contingent nomic necessitation views) that regard properties as categorical and laws as contingent. I discuss and reject the objections that (i) this view makes laws necessary whereas they are co…Read more
  • in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009.
  •  357
    Dispositional essentialism, a plausible view about the natures of (sparse or natural) properties, yields a satisfying explanation of the nature of laws also. The resulting necessitarian conception of laws comes in a weaker version, which allows differences between possible worlds as regards which laws hold in those worlds and a stronger version that does not. The main aim of this paper is to articulate what is involved in accepting the stronger version, most especially the consequence that all p…Read more
  •  172
    … And Then Again, He Might Not Be
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3): 517-521. 2009.
    In reply to Michael Bertrand, I clarify my view that the problem of physical evil is not an a priori problem but an a posteriori one.
  •  215
    Kuhn, naturalism, and the positivist legacy
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (2): 337-356. 2004.
    I defend against criticism the following claims concening Thomas Kuhn: (i) there is a strong naturalist streak in The structure of scientific revolutions, whereby Kuhn used the results of a posteriori enquiry in addressing philosophical questions; (ii) as Kuhn's career as a philosopher of science developed he tended to drop the naturalistic elements and to replace them with more traditionally philosophical a prior approaches; (iii) at the same there is a significant residue of positivist thought…Read more
  •  63
    Review of Stephen Mumford, David Armstrong (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5). 2008.
  •  404
    Inference to the only explanation (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2): 424-432. 2007.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
  •  228
    Philosophy of Science
    McGill-Queen's University Press. 1998.
    Many introductions to this field start with the problem of justifying scientific knowledge but Alexander Bird begins by examining the subject matter, or metaphysics, of science. Using topical scientific debates he vividly elucidates what it is for the world to be governed by laws of nature. This idea provides the basis for explanations and causes and leads to a discussion of natural kinds and theoretical entities. With this foundation in place he goes on to consider the epistemological issues of…Read more
  •  542
    The regress of pure powers?
    Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229). 2007.
    Dispositional monism is the view that natural properties and relations are ‘pure powers’. It is objected that dispositional monism involves some kind of vicious or otherwise unpalatable regress or circularity. I examine ways of making this objection precise. The most pressing interpretation is that is fails to make the identities of powers determinate. I demonstrate that this objection is in error. It does however puts certain constraints on what the structure of fundamental properties is like. …Read more