•  259
    Structural properties revisited
    In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and causes, Clarendon Press ;. pp. 215--41. 2009.
    Those who hold that all fundamental sparse properties have dispositional essences face a problem with structural (e.g. geometrical) properties. In this paper I consider a further route for the dispositional monist that is enabled by the requirement that physical theories should be background-free. If this requirement is respected then we can see how spatial displacement can be a causally active relation and hence may be understood dispositionally.
  •  837
    Antidotes all the way down?
    Theoria 19 (3): 259-69. 2004.
    Dispositions are related to conditionals. Typically a fragile glass will break if struck with force. But possession of the disposition does not entail the corresponding simple (subjunctive or counterfactual) conditional. The phenomena of finks and antidotes show that an object may possess the disposition without the conditional being true. Finks and antidotes may be thought of as exceptions to the straightforward relation between disposition and conditional. The existence of these phenomena are …Read more
  •  162
    Kripke
    In Christopher Belshaw & Gary Kemp (eds.), 12 Modern Philosophers, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 153--72. 2010.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Necessity and Essence Naming and Reference Rules and Meaning Conclusion References.
  •  126
    Referring to Natural Kind Thingamajigs, and What They Are: A Reply to Needham
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (1): 103-109. 2012.
    Natural kind terms appear to behave like singular terms. If they were genuine singular terms, appearing in true sentences, that would be some reason to believe that there are entities to which the terms refer, the natural kinds. Paul Needham has attacked my arguments that natural kind terms are singular, referring expressions. While conceding the correctness of some of his criticisms, I defend and expand on the underlying view in this paper. I also briefly sketch an account of what natural kinds…Read more
  •  322
    Is evidence non-inferential?
    Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215). 2004.
    Evidence is often taken to be foundational, in that while other propositions may be inferred from our evidence, evidence propositions are themselves not inferred from anything. I argue that this conception is false, since the non-inferential propositions on which beliefs are ultimately founded may be forgotten or undermined in the course of enquiry.
  •  77
    Pursuit of Truth
    Philosophical Books 32 (4): 235-237. 1991.
  •  687
    I show that Armstrong’s view of laws as second-order contingent relations of ‘necessitation’ among categorical properties faces a dilemma. The necessitation relation confers a relation of extensional inclusion (‘constant conjunction’) on its relata. It does so either necessarily or contingently. If necessarily, it is not a categorical relation (in the relevant sense). If contingently, then an explanation is required of how it confers extensional inclusion. That explanation will need to appeal to…Read more
  •  2
    Discovering the essences of natural kinds
    In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, Routledge. 2012.
  •  735
    Necessarily, salt dissolves in water
    Analysis 61 (4): 267-274. 2001.
    In this paper I aim to show that a certain law of nature, namely that common salt (sodium chloride) dissolves in water, is metaphysically necessary. The importance of this result is that it conflicts with a widely shared intuition that the laws of nature (most if not all) are contingent. There have been debates over whether some laws, such as Newton’s second law, might be definitional of their key terms and hence necessary. But the law that salt dissolves in water is not that kind of law. The law …Read more
  • Thomas Kuhn
    Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209): 654-657. 2002.
  •  71
    Looking for laws
    Metascience 15 441-54. 2006.
    Metascience 15 (2006) 441-54.
  •  104
    Three conservative Kuhns
    Social Epistemology 17 (2 & 3). 2003.
  •  42
    Book reviews (review)
    This book is part of the Fundamentals in Philosophy series, edited by John Shand, offering introductions to core areas of philosophy which are “not mere bland expositions, and as such are original pieces of philosophy in their own right”. Alexander Bird’s book meets this remit admirably. In my review I shall concentrate on the philosophical argument of the work and set aside its merits as a student text though they compare well with rivals currently on offer.