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7Christianity and Partisan PoliticsLogos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 2 (4): 82-96. 1999.
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129Homosexuality, Misogyny, and God’s PlanFaith and Philosophy 16 (2): 213-232. 1999.In response to powerful criticisms of older arguments, contemporary defenders of the Church’s traditional stance on homosexuality have fashioned a new kind of argument based upon the special relationship God created between the sexes. In this paper we examine two recent incarnations of this kind of argument and show that both fail to demonstrate the inherent immorality of homosexual relationships, and at most demonstrate that homosexual relationships are inferior to heterosexual relationships in…Read more
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73Does the Argument from Evil Assume a Consequentialist Morality?Faith and Philosophy 17 (3): 306-319. 2000.In this paper, I argue that the some of the most popular and influential formulations of the Argument from Evil (AE) assume a moral perspective that is essentially consequentialist, and would therefore be unacceptable to deontologists. Specifically, I examine formulations of the argument offered by William Rowe and Bruce Russell, both of whom explicitly assert that their formulation of AE is theoretically neutral with respect to consequentialism, and can be read in a way that is unobjectionable …Read more
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159Avoiding the Personhood Issue: Abortion, Identity, and Marquis's ‘Future‐Like‐Ours’ ArgumentBioethics 30 (4): 272-281. 2015.One reason for the persistent appeal of Don Marquis' ‘future like ours’ argument is that it seems to offer a way to approach the debate about the morality of abortion while sidestepping the difficult task of establishing whether the fetus is a person. This essay argues that in order to satisfactorily address both of the chief objections to FLO – the ‘identity objection’ and the ‘contraception objection’ – Marquis must take a controversial stand on what is most essential to being the kind of enti…Read more
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48Rape as an Essentially Contested ConceptHypatia 16 (2): 43-66. 2001.Because “rape” has such a powerful appraisive meaning, how one defines the term has normative significance. Those who define rape rigidly so as to exclude contemporary feminist understandings are therefore seeking to silence some moral perspectives “by definition.” I argue that understanding rape as an essentially contested concept allows the concept sufficient flexibility to permit open moral discourse, while at the same time preserving a core meaning that can frame the discourse.
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51Punishment and Community: The Reintegrative Theory of PunishmentCanadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1). 1996.There seems to be nearly universal agreement that society cannot do without some form of criminal punishment. At the same time, it is generally acknowledged that punishment, involving as it does the imposition of hardship and suffering, stands in need of justification. What form such a justification should take, however, is a matter of considerable contention, in part because of basic theoretical disagreements on the nature of moral obligation, and in part because of disagreements concerning the…Read more
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51Deep ecology and the irrelevance of moralityEnvironmental Ethics 18 (4): 411-424. 1996.Both Arne Naess and Warwick Fox have argued that deep ecology, in terms of “Selfrealization,” is essentially nonmoral. I argue that the attainment of the ecological Self does not render morality in the richest sense “superfluous,” as Fox suggests. To the contrary, the achievement of the ecological Self is a precondition for being a truly moral person, both from the perspective of a robust Kantian moral frameworkand from the perspective of Aristotelian virtue ethics. The opposition between selfre…Read more
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95A Deontological Theodicy? Swinburne’s Lapse and the Problem of Moral EvilFaith and Philosophy 31 (2): 181-203. 2014.Richard Swinburne’s formulation of the argument from evil is representative of a pervasive way of understanding the challenge evil poses for theistic belief. But there is an error in Swinburne’s formulation : he fails to consider possible deontological constraints on God’s legitimate responses to evil. To demonstrate the error’s significance, I show that some important objections to Swinburne’s theodicy admit of a novel answer once we correct for Swinburne’s Lapse. While more is needed to show t…Read more
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123Defining Terrorism for Public Policy Purposes: The Group-Target DefinitionJournal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2): 253-278. 2010.For the sake of developing and evaluating public policy decisions aimed at combating terrorism, we need a precise public definition of terrorism that distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence. Ordinary usage does not provide a basis for such a definition, and so it must be stipulative. I propose essentially pragmatic criteria for developing such a stipulative public definition. After noting that definitions previously proposed in the philosophical literature are inadequate based on th…Read more
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78Alan Wertheimer, consent to sexual relations (cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2003), pp. XV + 293Utilitas 19 (2): 261-263. 2007.
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14Transformation of the Self in the Thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher (review)Faith and Philosophy 28 (4): 474-478. 2011.
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57Personally Committed To Nonviolence: Towards A Vindication Of Personal PacifismThe Acorn 10 (2): 30-41. 2000.
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12Deep Ecology and the Irrelevance of MoralityEnvironmental Ethics 18 (4): 411-424. 1996.Both Arne Naess and Warwick Fox have argued that deep ecology, in terms of “Selfrealization,” is essentially nonmoral. I argue that the attainment of the ecological Self does not render morality in the richest sense “superfluous,” as Fox suggests. To the contrary, the achievement of the ecological Self is a precondition for being a truly moral person, both from the perspective of a robust Kantian moral frameworkand from the perspective of Aristotelian virtue ethics. The opposition between selfre…Read more
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22Moving the Goalposts? The Challenge of Philosophical Engagement with the Public God DebatesPhilo 13 (1): 80-93. 2010.When philosophers contribute to public debates as polarized as contemporary ones about theistic belief, it is common to encounter responses that, philosophically, are woefully misguided. While it is tempting to simply dismiss them, a closer examination of recurring responses can offer insight of philosophical significance. In this paper I exemplify the value of engaging with recurring but misguided popular objections by looking carefully at one such objection to my recent book, Is God a Delusion…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Religion |
Applied Ethics |
Normative Ethics |