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38Automatic goals and conscious regulation in social cognitive affective neuroscienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2): 156-157. 2014.
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163Telling More Than We Can Know About Intentional ActionMind and Language 26 (3): 353-380. 2011.Recently, a number of philosophers have advanced a surprising conclusion: people's judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally are pervasively influenced by normative considerations. In this paper, we investigate the ‘Chairman case’, an influential case from this literature and disagree with this conclusion. Using a statistical method called structural path modeling, we show that people's attributions of intentional action to an agent are driven not by normative asses…Read more
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1914How is Willpower Possible? The Puzzle of Synchronic Self‐Control and the Divided MindNoûs 48 (1): 41-74. 2012.Peer Reviewed.
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43The 2014 Tanner Symposium features a panel of speakers discussing current research in the areas of volition and self-control and the effects of that research for issues of public policy.
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22Using big data to map the network organization of the brainBehavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1): 101-102. 2014.
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522Self-expression: a deep self theory of moral responsibilityPhilosophical Studies 173 (5): 1203-1232. 2016.According to Dewey, we are responsible for our conduct because it is “ourselves objectified in action”. This idea lies at the heart of an increasingly influential deep self approach to moral responsibility. Existing formulations of deep self views have two major problems: They are often underspecified, and they tend to understand the nature of the deep self in excessively rationalistic terms. Here I propose a new deep self theory of moral responsibility called the Self-Expression account that ad…Read more
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1682What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3): 563-593. 2011.Incompatibilists and compatibilists (mostly) agree that there is a strong intuition that a manipulated agent, i.e., an agent who is the victim of methods such as indoctrination or brainwashing, is unfree. They differ however on why exactly this intuition arises. Incompatibilists claim our intuitions in these cases are sensitive to the manipulated agent’s lack of ultimate control over her actions, while many compatibilists argue that our intuitions respond to damage inflicted by manipulation on t…Read more
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1154Mental State Attributions and the Side-Effect EffectJournal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (1): 232-238. 2012.The side-effect effect, in which an agent who does not speci␣cally intend an outcome is seen as having brought it about intentionally, is thought to show that moral factors inappropriately bias judgments of intentionality, and to challenge standard mental state models of intentionality judgments. This study used matched vignettes to dissociate a number of moral factors and mental states. Results support the view that mental states, and not moral factors, explain the side-effect effect. However, …Read more
Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |