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Theron Pummer

University of St. Andrews
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    32
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    8
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 More details
  • University of St. Andrews
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
University of California, San Diego
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2013
Email (login required)
Homepage
St Andrews, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
0000-0003-0147-9917
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics
Value Theory
Metaphysics
Applied Ethics
Social and Political Philosophy
  • All publications (32)
  •  2049
    Intuitions about large number cases
    Analysis 73 (1): 37-46. 2013.
    Is there some large number of very mild hangnail pains, each experienced by a separate person, which would be worse than two years of excruciating torture, experienced by a single person? Many people have the intuition that the answer to this question is No. However, a host of philosophers have argued that, because we have no intuitive grasp of very large numbers, we should not trust such intuitions. I argue that there is decent intuitive support for the No answer, which does not depend on our i…Read more
    Is there some large number of very mild hangnail pains, each experienced by a separate person, which would be worse than two years of excruciating torture, experienced by a single person? Many people have the intuition that the answer to this question is No. However, a host of philosophers have argued that, because we have no intuitive grasp of very large numbers, we should not trust such intuitions. I argue that there is decent intuitive support for the No answer, which does not depend on our intuitively grasping or imagining very large numbers
    Population EthicsAggregation and ConsequentialismObjections to UtilitarianismIntransitivity of ValueRead more
    Population EthicsAggregation and ConsequentialismObjections to UtilitarianismIntransitivity of ValueMoral Intuitionism
  •  1019
    Risky Giving
    The Philosophers' Magazine 73 (2): 62-70. 2016.
    We might worry that Peter Singer’s argument from “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” is unconvincing to non-consequentialists who accept moral constraints against imposing significant risks of harm on individuals. After all, giving to overseas charities often comes with such risks. I argue that plausible non-consequentialist criteria imply that it is not wrong to give to at least some of the charities that Singer and other effective altruists recommend.
    Beneficence in Applied EthicsDemandingness of ConsequentialismHarm in Applied EthicsEffective Altrui…Read more
    Beneficence in Applied EthicsDemandingness of ConsequentialismHarm in Applied EthicsEffective AltruismDeontological Moral Theories
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