•  2007
    Lopsided Lives
    In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 275-296. 2011.
    Intuitively there are many different things that non-derivatively contribute to well-being: pleasure, desire satisfaction, knowledge, friendship, love, rationality, freedom, moral virtue, and appreciation of true beauty. According to pluralism, at least two different types of things non-derivatively contribute to well-being. Lopsided lives score very low in terms of some types of things that putatively non-derivatively contribute to well-being, but very high in terms of other such types of thing…Read more
  •  2044
    The Worseness of Nonexistence
    In Solberg Gamlund and (ed.), Saving lives from the badness of death, Oxford University Press. pp. 215-228. 2019.
    Most believe that it is worse for a person to die than to continue to exist with a good life. At the same time, many believe that it is not worse for a merely possible person never to exist than to exist with a good life. I argue that if the underlying properties that make us the sort of thing we essentially are can come in small degrees, then to maintain this commonly-held pair of beliefs we will have to embrace an implausible sort of evaluative hypersensitivity to slight nonevaluative differen…Read more