-
2007Lopsided LivesIn Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 275-296. 2011.Intuitively there are many different things that non-derivatively contribute to well-being: pleasure, desire satisfaction, knowledge, friendship, love, rationality, freedom, moral virtue, and appreciation of true beauty. According to pluralism, at least two different types of things non-derivatively contribute to well-being. Lopsided lives score very low in terms of some types of things that putatively non-derivatively contribute to well-being, but very high in terms of other such types of thing…Read more
-
2044The Worseness of NonexistenceIn Solberg Gamlund and (ed.), Saving lives from the badness of death, Oxford University Press. pp. 215-228. 2019.Most believe that it is worse for a person to die than to continue to exist with a good life. At the same time, many believe that it is not worse for a merely possible person never to exist than to exist with a good life. I argue that if the underlying properties that make us the sort of thing we essentially are can come in small degrees, then to maintain this commonly-held pair of beliefs we will have to embrace an implausible sort of evaluative hypersensitivity to slight nonevaluative differen…Read more
St Andrews, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
| Normative Ethics |
| Value Theory |
| Metaphysics |
| Applied Ethics |
| Social and Political Philosophy |