-
Two forms of antiskepticismIn Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Mit Press. 2003.
-
330A foundationalist account of the justification of our empirical beliefs is committed to the following two claims: (1) Sense experience is a source of justification. (2) Some empirical beliefs are basic: justified without receiving their justification from any other beliefs. In this paper, I will defend each of these claims against an objection. The objection to (1) that I will discuss is due to Donald Davidson. He writes: The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sen…Read more
-
261EpistemologyStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or …Read more
-
4215Belief, Voluntariness and IntentionalityDialectica 65 (4): 537-559. 2011.In this paper, I examine Alston's arguments for doxastic involuntarism. Alston fails to distinguish (i) between volitional and executional lack of control, and (ii) between compatibilist and libertarian control. As a result, he fails to notice that, if one endorses a compatibilist notion of voluntary control, the outcome is a straightforward and compelling case for doxastic voluntarism. Advocates of involuntarism have recently argued that the compatibilist case for doxastic voluntarism can be bl…Read more
-
Twentieth centuryIn Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy, Routledge. pp. 469. 2008.
-
216Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2001.This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. It contains the best recent work in this area by major figures such as Ernest Sosa, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, and Susan Haak.
-
221Empiricism, metaphysics, and voluntarismSynthese 178 (1): 19-26. 2011.This paper makes three points: First, empiricism as a stance is problematic unless criteria for evaluating the stance are provided. Second, Van Fraassen conceives of the empiricist stance as receiving its content, at least in part, from the rejection of metaphysics. But the rejection of metaphysics seems to presuppose for its justification the very empiricist doctrine Van Fraassen intends to replace with the empiricist stance. Third, while I agree with Van Fraassen’s endorsement of voluntarism, …Read more
-
2Are Mental States Luminous?In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 217--36. 2009.
-
12Real Knowing New Versions of the Coherence Theory (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3): 740-743. 2002.In this book, which is as much about postmodern continental philosophy as about analytic epistemology, Alcoff argues that epistemology is in need of a reorientation away from foundationalism and metaphysical realism toward coherentism and what Alcoff calls “immanent” realism. Alcoff begins, in the book’s introduction, by making an initial case for coherentism and against dismissing epistemology altogether. She considers it a valuable postmodernist insight that philosophical theorizing reflects s…Read more
-
28Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy (review)Philosophical Review 109 (3): 462. 2000.In this book, Almeder distinguishes between three kinds of naturalism: Quine’s recommendation to replace traditional epistemology with science; the kind of reliabilism advocated in Alvin Goldman’s Epistemology and Cognition, according to which traditional epistemology should at least partially be transformed into science; and the kind Almeder himself proposes, which he calls “harmless” naturalism. The former two are examples of scientism: according to Almeder, the mistaken view that the only ans…Read more
-
2Evidentialist anti-skepticismIn Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents, Oxford University Press. 2011.
-
155Contextualism and conceptual disambiguationActa Analytica 20 (1): 3-15. 2005.I distinguish between Old Contextualism, New Contextualism, and the Multiple Concepts Theory. I argue that Old Contextualism cannot handle the following three problems: (i) the disquotational paradox, (ii) upward pressure resistance, (iii) inability to avoid the acceptance of skeptical conclusions. New Contextualism, in contrast, can avoid these problems. However, since New Contextualism appears to be a semanticized mirror image of MCT, it remains unclear whether it is in fact a genuine version …Read more
-
The Directly and the Indirectly EvidentDissertation, Brown University. 1985.Two claims are essential to foundationalist theories of knowledge. First, that there are directly evident propositions; secondly, that, in justifying a particular knowledge claim, one ultimately arrives at a directly evident proposition making another proposition evident. In this dissertation, both claims are being defended. ;In defense of the first claim, a week definition of a proposition's being directly evident is suggested. Any attack against foundationalism rejecting the first claim must s…Read more
-
23Moral Truth and Coherence: Comments on GoldmanSouthern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1): 185-188. 1991.
-
49Does Phenomenal Conservatism Solve Internalism’s Dilemma?In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 135. 2013.
-
187Belief control and intentionalitySynthese 188 (2): 145-163. 2012.In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston's defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional
-
39
-
103
-
168Is Epistemic Circularity Bad?Res Philosophica 90 (2): 215-235. 2013.Is it possible to argue that one’s memory is reliable without using one’s memory? I argue that it is not. Since it is not, it is impossible to defend the reliability of one’s memory without employing reasoning that is epistemically circular. Hence, if epistemic circularity is vicious, it is impossible to succeed in producing a cogent argument for the reliability of one’s memory. The same applies to any other one of one’s cognitive faculties. I further argue that, if epistemic circularity is vici…Read more
-
317Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2005.Eleven pairs of newly commissioned essays face off on opposite sides of fundamental problems in current theories of knowledge. Brings together fresh debates on eleven of the most controversial issues in epistemology. Questions addressed include: Is knowledge contextual? Can skepticism be refuted? Can beliefs be justified through coherence alone? Is justified belief responsible belief? Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion. Will serve as an acce…Read more
-
137
Boulder, Colorado, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Knowledge |
Skepticism |
Metaphysics |