Frank Scalambrino

This concluding chapter considers major “turns” in the Contemporary period of Western psychology; these include: the “Linguistic Turn,” the “Performative Turn” (associated primarily with Postmodernism), the “Cognitive Turn,” and the “Historical Turn.” On the one hand, Contemporary psychology is found sufficiently embroiled in politics and culture so as to call its methodological-grounding into question and to justify a comparison with time in its history when it was inextricably entwined with ethics and morality. On the other hand, the impact of the “Cognitive Revolution” on psychology has been nearly normalizing. Thus, this chapter discusses the influence of these “turns” in the sciences and humanities on psychology, while re-emphasizing the importance of philosophical principles and incommensurabilities for the study and practice of Contemporary psychology with integrity.

Toward contextualization, essential general distinctions are discussed regarding the interpretation of psychology throughout Western history, especially the distinction between natural and human science. Providing arguments against attempts to deny the selection of, and commitment to, principles, for example, the positions of eclecticism and anarchism, the chapter discusses principles and distinctions associated with hermeneutics and the “philosophy of psychology,” so that readers may employ such distinctions to think through the systems of psychology in later chapters. The general distinctions used to organize the material of the remaining chapters is introduced; that is, in the remaining chapters, the philosophical principles of psychology constituting the various historical systems in the West are organized in terms of: structure, function, and methodology.

This introductory chapter discusses the basic principles needed to understand the point of view this book takes regarding the history and systems of Western Psychology. On the one hand, the principles constitute essential distinctions operable in regard to the study of history and historiography. On the other hand, among the distinctions discussed regarding the “systems” of Western psychology, this chapter explains what is meant by “incommensurability.” The principle of incommensurability is essential for thinking through the systems of Western psychology. Finally, this chapter explains how the terms “principles” and “distinctions” are used in this book.

Directly analogous to the relation between methodology and the call for a “new philosophy,” this chapter discusses the “new psychology” established by Wilhelm Wundt. From the point of view of the philosophical principles constituting the Modern and Contemporary systems of Western psychology, a pre-Kantian, (neo) Kantian, and post-Kantian grouping goes toward emphasizing the incommensurabilities found across the “Four Forces” of Contemporary psychology, the emergence of which are associated with Pavlov, Freud, Kant, and Hegel; that is, Behaviorism, Psychoanalysis, Existential-Humanistic, and the ultimately Bertalanffy’s General Systems Theory. The incommensurabilities are emphasized in terms of essential distinctions regarding structure, function, and methodology, such as between natural and human science, determinism and free will, and the principles with which each “Force” establishes ontological priority.

Beginning with the principles of the Renaissance and the Modern Scientific Revolution, this chapter focuses on the “crisis of authority” which is historically understood to have called for a new methodology to found a “new philosophy.” Just as René Descartes’ philosophy was understood to have met the criteria of the “new philosophy,” so too it accomplished a shift from a Theo-centric to an Ego-centric understanding of psychology and established new problems as foundational for psychology, such as, the “mind-body problem.” After examining multiple principles introduced throughout Early Modern philosophy regarding these foundational problems for Early Modern psychology, the principles and distinctions to emerge from Immanuel Kant’s transcendental philosophy are discussed as of critical importance in the history of Western psychology.

This chapter discusses the principles and essential distinctions constituting the study of Western psychology from Socrates to the beginning of Renaissance and Early Modern psychology. These principles and distinctions are associated with such luminaries as: Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Epictetus, Thomas Aquinas, and William of Ockham. Inextricably entwined with principles of ethics and morality, Pre-Modern psychology showcases an emphasis on the principles of freedom of the will, natural law, personhood, teleology and soteriology. A significant explication is provided regarding the systems of psychology found in the writings of Plato and Aristotle with their principles and distinctions organized in terms of structure, function, and methodology.

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'Reductio ad Hitlerum (RAH)'. RAH is a species of the reductio ad hominem genre of logically fallacious reasoning. It is clear that ad hominem arguments, such as RAH, may be understood as “fallacies of relevance”. The most notorious example of the RAH in philosophy is the association of Martin Heidegger with Hitler and the Nazi Party. The RAH makes it seem as though philosophically critiquing the Cartesian worldview or providing proofs of valid inference in a formal logic course would be tantamount to being desirous of perpetrating the Holocaust. Thus, the logical question regarding the truth‐value of Heidegger's philosophical claims is separate from the moral question of whether actions perpetrated by “Nazis”, or in the name of “Nazism”, were evil.

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'psychologist's fallacy'. William James, in his Principles of Psychology, coined “the psychologist's fallacy”. It is a fallacy of relativism. James articulated the psychologist's fallacy as if it were a confusion between first‐person and third‐person points of view. Importantly, an experience and its description are different, and from the first‐person point of view, whatever a person experiences is identical with what that experience is. Therefore, the first‐person point of view of an experience, because it is the view of actually having the experience itself, is itself the truth of the experience. To avoid this fallacy, one needs to ground arguments with claims that hold necessarily and universally. Neither descriptions of experience based on subjective judgments nor the occurrence of specific accidental‐psychological events hold necessarily or universally regarding human psychology.

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called the subjectivist fallacy (SbF). The SbF occurs when one concludes that something is true for one person (a subject) but not true for another person (another subject), when, in fact, it is true objectively for all persons. SbF is a fallacy of relativism. Relativism, in general, means the truth‐value of a judgment is neither necessary nor universal; however, there are multiple kinds of relativism. SbF is not only a fallacious depiction of relativity; it is also self‐refuting. To avoid this fallacy, one needs to ground arguments with claims that are objective or that hold universally. When the claims on which an argument is based are objectively verifiable or pertain to a set of individuals universally, then the logical necessity of the argument's conclusion may be determined.

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'genetic fallacy' (GnF). One commits the GnF when advocating for a conclusion based solely on origin. This is a fallacy of relevance—irrelevance, really—because the origin of a claim may be irrelevant to its truth‐value. That is to say, providing an account of the genesis of a claim, its history or origin, may be informative and helpful; however, it need not determine the truth‐value of the claim. Therefore, when one draws a conclusion regarding the truth‐value of a claim based solely on the origin of the claim, then one may have committed the GnF. In the ethical language of “means and ends” reasoning, GnF helps to highlight the problematic nature of the utilitarian‐style disconnect between the justice of actions and the goodness of their consequences.

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'existential fallacy'. This fallacy occurs when we erroneously suppose some class or group has members. In other words, statements may be true about classes or groups even if no members of the class or group exist. In terms of syllogistic argumentation, this is a formal fallacy in that it results when the premises are universal in quantification and the conclusion is particular. In the history of logic, the existential fallacy may be traced to dictum de omni, which refers to the principle in Aristotelian logic that whatever is said universally of a subject is said of everything that is contained under such a subject. In order to avoid this fallacy, one should look for empirical verification of the existence of whatever entity may be in question.

The term “existentialism” was coined in the 1940s. Whereas other books regarding existentialism merely repeat the platitudes that “There is no such thing as existentialism” or that “The term ‘existentialism’ has no coherent meaning,” this two-volume set actually answers the question “What is existentialism?” ------- Volume I identifies the seven (7) principles of existentialism and the necessary and sufficient conditions for a philosophy to be existential, and introduces readers to the depth of the problem by showing how the question “What is existentialism?” can be answered in multiple ways, all of which are provided in this two-volume set. ------- Vol. I, then, provides the “archaeological” answer to the question by showing the philosophical framework existentialism inherited from transcendental philosophy. Vol. I also provides the “genealogical” answer by tracing the history of the thematization of this framework through German Romanticism, concluding with an illustration of how the major existential philosophers: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, and Marcel, expressed and developed the principles of existentialism. ------- Volume II provides a discussion of essential distinctions with which to correctly understand, and formulate thoughts about, existentialism, for example, discussions of existentialism as a kind of character ethics, existentialism as a critique of Descartes’ philosophy, the difference between existential individuality and modern subjectivity, and a discussion of the “moment of vision.” ------- Vol. II concludes, then, with a discussion of how existential philosophy takes be-ing, as an end-in-itself, as its point of origin. Vol. II also provides a number of helpful appendices. These appendices address some miscellaneous, though important, concerns regarding existentialism, and provide charts illustrating the interrelations between the key concepts of existentialism.

This book provides a discussion of the philosophy of being according to three major traditions in Western philosophy, the Analytic, the Continental, and the Thomistic. The origin of the point of view of each of these traditions is associated with a seminal figure, Gottlob Frege, Immanuel Kant, and Thomas Aquinas, respectively. The questions addressed in this book are constitutional for the philosophy of being, considering the meaning of being, the relationship between thinking and being, and the methods for using thought to access being. On the one hand, the book honors diversity and pluralism, as it highlights how the three traditions may be clearly and distinctly differentiated regarding the philosophy of being. On the other hand, it honors a sense of solidarity and ecumenism, as it demonstrates how the methods and focal points of these traditions constitute, and continue to shape, the development of Western philosophy. This book contributes toward an essential overview of Western metaphysics and will be of particular interest to those working in the history of philosophy and in the philosophy of being.

[PHILPEOPLE DOESN'T ALLOW PARAGRAPH BREAKS IN ABSTRACTS...] My [Frank Scalambrino's] dissertation first traces the development of a philosophical theory of ontological negation from Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist through Aristotle’s Metaphysics to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, especially his “Table of Nothing” (A 292). Whereas Plato’s “puzzle of non-being” sets the stage for the subsequent discussion of ontological negation, Kant’s Table of Nothing provides a formalization of the possible solutions to the puzzle. According to Kant, there are four (4) different ways in which “ontological negation” could be meant. By way of this formalization two major trends for interpreting ontological negation may be seen in the history of Western philosophy. The Aristotelian trend may be seen as a reduction of ontological negation to logical negation such that the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing is eliminated. This Aristotelian trend was later adopted by both Hegel and Heidegger. [NEW PARAGRAPH......................................................................................................................................................................................................]The Platonic trend, exemplified by the “puzzle of non-being” from the Sophist, affirms what is later formalized as the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing. How exactly to characterize such ontological negation is precisely “the puzzle of non-being.” The idea being that if it is not even possible to characterize this type of ontological negation, then it should be eliminated, that is, by following Aristotle’s trend and reducing ontological negation to logical negation. It was as a reaction against Hegel, and thereby the Aristotelian trend regarding ontological negation, then, which prompted Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida to take up the puzzle of non-being and pursue the Platonic trend. [NEW PARAGRAPH......................................................................................................................................................................................................]Both of their solutions to the puzzle of non-being follow the Platonic trend in two (2) ways: first, they affirm the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing, and, second, they take an approach already initiated in the Sophist; that is, they attempt to characterize ontological negation in terms of one of Plato’s “Great Kinds” – Difference. Of course, both Deleuze and Derrida take a post-Kantian approach to characterizing ontological negation in terms of difference. In fact, given the internal criteria of the puzzle of non-being, in terms of historical hindsight, Kant’s critical turn seems a necessary condition for solving the puzzle. Therefore, both Deleuze and Derrida characterize ontological negation in terms of “pure difference.” When we interrogate the idea of “pure difference” we find that it refers to Différance in Derrida and what Deleuze refers to as “?-being.” [NEW PARAGRAPH......................................................................................................................................................................................................]Next, my dissertation provides a critical reading of “pure difference” in Deleuze and Derrida by criticizing the ability of “pure difference” to characterize the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing. The criticism culminates in my advancing a different characterization of the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing. Whereas Deleuze and Derrida provide solutions from the standpoint of a post-Kantian general ontology, I provide a solution from the standpoint of a philosophical psychology, understood in terms of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. That is to say, I provide a characterization of the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing in terms of the relation between the Critique of Pure Reason’s Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. By juxtaposing a Kantian ontology in terms of philosophical psychology and general ontology, I examine the difference between the transcendental structure of internal time-consciousness and the register in general ontology conforming to the transcendental structure of time-consciousness, specifically what may be understood as the transcendental structure conditioning the human experience of the duration of a moment. Given that this structure is both “transcendental” and the condition for experiencing “duration,” I refer to it as “transcendental memory.” [NEW PARAGRAPH......................................................................................................................................................................................................]Thus, the limits constituting the experience of the duration of a moment for humans may be used to characterize the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing. On the one hand, this provides a solution to the puzzle of non-being along the lines of the Platonic trend. On the other hand, this provides a solid basis for criticizing attempts to solve the puzzle along the Aristotelian trend. Further, the solution to the puzzle of non-being found in my dissertation provides a way to extend Kant’s theoretical philosophy and a pathway for future metaphysics. (Frank Scalambrino, Ph.D. Duquesne University, 2011)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'psychologist's fallacy'. William James, in his Principles of Psychology, coined “the psychologist's fallacy”. It is a fallacy of relativism. James articulated the psychologist's fallacy as if it were a confusion between first‐person and third‐person points of view. Importantly, an experience and its description are different, and from the first‐person point of view, whatever a person experiences is identical with what that experience is. Therefore, the first‐person point of view of an experience, because it is the view of actually having the experience itself, is itself the truth of the experience. To avoid this fallacy, one needs to ground arguments with claims that hold necessarily and universally. Neither descriptions of experience based on subjective judgments nor the occurrence of specific accidental‐psychological events hold necessarily or universally regarding human psychology.

This chapter philosophically examines the transformation of “Walter White” into “Heisenberg,” as depicted in the television series Breaking Bad, in terms of Søren Kierkegaard’s “stages of life” and Carl Jung’s “process of individuation.” Though Walt’s transformation is an oft-discussed topic regarding Breaking Bad, there has yet to appear in the philosophical literature an examination of this transformation in terms of Kierkegaard and Jung. Such an examination is important since it also addresses a number of the questions regarding the shift in Walt’s moral compass given his terminal prognosis. That is to say, Walt’s transformation into Heisenberg in terms of Kierkegaard and Jung provides a moral account of his decisions without sacrificing a notion of his free-will or accepting the imminence of death as justification for the perpetration of evil.

In this article I take a phenomenological approach to clarify the concept of habit and advance the discussion of the relation between habit and social reality. This approach clarifies what may be referred to as Aristotle’s understanding of the reciprocal nature of virtue in regard to the virtuous agent. Reading virtue, then, as a kind of disposition which determines the value system in which an agent participates, a phenomenological understanding of the intersubjective ground of social reality emerges. This advances the discussion of the relation between habit and social reality with a more robust understanding of normativity.

Introduction to Ethics: A Primer for the Western Tradition is designed for Introduction to Ethics courses which survey the history of ideas in the Western philosophical tradition. Introducing students to essential normative and meta-ethical distinctions both in regard to perennial primary sources and in abstract form, this book has been deliberately constructed in a style geared toward learning and remembering core material, while facilitating the comparison of ideas across the history of the Western tradition. Though this book may be used as a standalone resource, optimally, this book should be used alongside primary source readings. While respecting the depth of the standard historical divisions in Western philosophy, Introduction to Ethics: A Primer for the Western Tradition emphasizes the traditional metaethical concerns of philosophers to provide a philosophically robust understanding of: Goodness, Freedom, Friendship, Integrity, Happiness, and Human Excellence. This book also aims to present, with sufficient commensurability, normative ethical theories for students to consider as so many strategies for engaging in ethical decision-making and for performing ethically-minded actions. Philosophers discussed include, but are not limited to: Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Epictetus, Augustine, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Bentham, J.S. Mill, and Nietzsche. Introduction to Ethics: A Primer for the Western Tradition is designed to facilitate discussion and critical thinking in ethics by, for example, concisely presenting the central grounds for justification, such as, consequences, duties, and virtues and the central themes of contextualization, such as, cultural relativism, divine command theory, and nihilism, informing the Western philosophical tradition. Other notions discussed, central to moral psychology, moral social development, and ethics, in the Western tradition include: the relation between Reason and Passion, Emotion, Pleasure, Intuition, Attitude, Fate, Conscience, Personhood, Natural Law, the “State of Nature,” Responsibility, Rights, Justice, and Good Will.

Taking philosophical principles as a point of departure, this book provides essential distinctions for thinking through the history and systems of Western psychology. The book is concisely designed to help readers navigate through the length and complexity found in history of psychology textbooks. From Plato to beyond Post-Modernism, the author examines the choices and commitments made by theorists and practitioners of psychology and discusses the philosophical thinking from which they stem. What kind of science is psychology? Is structure, function, or methodology foremost in determining psychology's subject matter? Psychology, as the behaviorist views it, is not the same as the psychoanalyst's view of it, or the existentialist's, so how may contemporary psychology philosophically-sustain both pluralism and incommensurability? This book will be of great value to students and scholars of the history of psychology.