As it is commonly used, the concept of dignity applies to people as well as to groups of people. It is sometimes supposed to encapsulate such widely different notions as privacy, physical or mental integrity and personality. There is something puzzling in such a situation. This article argues, firstly, that the concept of dignity is best understood when applying ‹only› to autonomy, perfectibility and rationality. Belonging to the language of morals, the concept of dignity has something strongly …
Read moreAs it is commonly used, the concept of dignity applies to people as well as to groups of people. It is sometimes supposed to encapsulate such widely different notions as privacy, physical or mental integrity and personality. There is something puzzling in such a situation. This article argues, firstly, that the concept of dignity is best understood when applying ‹only› to autonomy, perfectibility and rationality. Belonging to the language of morals, the concept of dignity has something strongly prescriptive built into it: its function is to justify prohibitions in our ways of dealing with persons. But if interpreted as depending on the actual possession of some capacities, it fails to do its job, because it applies to too few people; and if interpreted as expressing an essence, it fails because it gives way to some form of discrimination. It is suggested that a two-level use of the notion of dignity could improve things, albeit at the cost of trivialising the notion
