More details
Cambridge University
Faculty of Philosophy
PhD, 1998
St Andrews, FIfe, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language
Applied Ethics
Normative Ethics
Philosophy of Law
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality
  •  166
    The Structure of Objects (review)
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3): 336-339. 2010.
    Short review of The Structure of Objects by Kathrin Koslicki.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsFundamentalityMereology
  •  82
    Persistence and Time
    In Steven Luper (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death, Cambridge University Press. pp. 47-63. 2014.
    In this chapter I outline some metaphysical views about time, and about persistence, and discuss how they can help us clarify our thinking about life and death.
    The Badness of DeathPersonal Identity and Values, Misc
  •  501
    Science as a Guide to Metaphysics?
    Synthese 149 (3): 451-470. 2006.
    Analytic metaphysics is in resurgence; there is renewed and vigorous interest in topics such as time, causation, persistence, parthood and possible worlds. We who share this interest often pay lip-service to the idea that metaphysics should be informed by modern science; some take this duty very seriously.2 But there is also a widespread suspicion that science cannot really contribute to metaphysics, and that scientific findings grossly underdetermine metaphysical claims. For some, this prompts …Read more
    Methodology in MetaphysicsAbduction and Scientific Realism
  •  2468
    Ontological Innocence
    In A. J. Cotnoir & Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 70-89. 2014.
    In this chapter, I examine Lewis's ideas about ontological innocence, ontological commitment and double-counting, in his discussion of composition as identity in Parts of Classes. I attempt to understand these primarily as epistemic or methodological claims: how far can we get down this route without adopting radical metaphysical theses about composition as identity?
    Ontological CommitmentComposition as Identity
  •  345
    N eo-F regeanism and Q uantifier V ariance
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 233-249. 2007.
    In his paper in the same volume, Sider argues that, of maximalism and quantifier variance, the latter promises to let us make better sense of neo-Fregeanism. I argue that neo-Fregeans should, and seemingly do, reject quantifier variance. If they must choose between these two options, they should choose maximalism.
    OntologyOntological PluralismMathematical Neo-FregeanismQuantification and Ontology
  •  103
    VII—Vagueness and Existence
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (2): 125-140. 2002.
    Vague existence can seem like the worst kind of vagueness in the world, or seem to be an entirely unintelligible notion. This bad reputation is based upon the rumour that if there is vague existence then there are non-existent objects. But the rumour is false: the modest brand of vague existence entailed by certain metaphysical theories of composition does not deserve its bad reputation
    Vague Objects
  •  191
    Critical Notice of Every Thing Must Go
    Metascience 19 (2): 174-179. 2010.
    This is a critical notice of Ladyman and Ross et al's Every Thing Must Go. I argue that they mischaracterise much of so-called 'analytic metaphysics', and that they could have usefully drawn upon the resources of current metaphysics in order to articulate their own views more clearly. The piece appears in a symposium which also includes contributions by Kyle Stanford and Paul Humphreys, with responses from Ladyman and Ross
    Methodology in MetaphysicsPhilosophy of Physical Science, MiscellaneousPhilosophy of Physics, Genera…Read more
  •  469
    Types of Personal Identity
    Cogito 11 (2): 117-122. 1997.
    This is a paper, aimed at students, which sets out some issues regarding personal identity over time.
    Personal Identity, Misc
  •  381
    Principles of composition and criteria of identity
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4). 2006.
    I argue that, despite van Inwagen’s pessimism about the task, it is worth looking for answers to his General Composition Question. Such answers or ‘principles of composition’ tell us about the relationship between an object and its parts. I compare principles of composition with criteria of identity, arguing that, just as different sorts of thing satisfy different criteria of identity, they may satisfy different principles of composition. Variety in criteria of identity is not taken to reflect o…Read more
    MereologyCoincident ObjectsCriteria of Identity
  •  82
    Metaphysics and relativity
    In Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.
    This is a very introductory introduction to some ways in which the special and general theories of relativity may bear upon metaphysical questions about the nature of time and space, and the persistence of objects.
    Physics of TimeTime and ChangePresentismEternalismThree- and Four-Dimensionalism
  •  523
    How things persist
    Oxford University Press. 2001.
    Katherine Hawley explores and compares three theories of persistence -- endurance, perdurance, and stage theories - investigating the ways in which they attempt to account for the world around us. Having provided valuable clarification of its two main rivals, she concludes by advocating stage theory.
    Space and TimeThree- and Four-DimensionalismStage Theory