More details
Cambridge University
Faculty of Philosophy
PhD, 1998
St Andrews, FIfe, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language
Applied Ethics
Normative Ethics
Philosophy of Law
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality
  •  2458
    Ontological Innocence
    In A. J. Cotnoir & Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 70-89. 2014.
    In this chapter, I examine Lewis's ideas about ontological innocence, ontological commitment and double-counting, in his discussion of composition as identity in Parts of Classes. I attempt to understand these primarily as epistemic or methodological claims: how far can we get down this route without adopting radical metaphysical theses about composition as identity?
    Ontological CommitmentComposition as Identity
  •  343
    N eo-F regeanism and Q uantifier V ariance
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 233-249. 2007.
    In his paper in the same volume, Sider argues that, of maximalism and quantifier variance, the latter promises to let us make better sense of neo-Fregeanism. I argue that neo-Fregeans should, and seemingly do, reject quantifier variance. If they must choose between these two options, they should choose maximalism.
    OntologyOntological PluralismMathematical Neo-FregeanismQuantification and Ontology
  •  101
    VII—Vagueness and Existence
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (2): 125-140. 2002.
    Vague existence can seem like the worst kind of vagueness in the world, or seem to be an entirely unintelligible notion. This bad reputation is based upon the rumour that if there is vague existence then there are non-existent objects. But the rumour is false: the modest brand of vague existence entailed by certain metaphysical theories of composition does not deserve its bad reputation
    Vague Objects
  •  191
    Critical Notice of Every Thing Must Go
    Metascience 19 (2): 174-179. 2010.
    This is a critical notice of Ladyman and Ross et al's Every Thing Must Go. I argue that they mischaracterise much of so-called 'analytic metaphysics', and that they could have usefully drawn upon the resources of current metaphysics in order to articulate their own views more clearly. The piece appears in a symposium which also includes contributions by Kyle Stanford and Paul Humphreys, with responses from Ladyman and Ross
    Methodology in MetaphysicsPhilosophy of Physical Science, MiscellaneousPhilosophy of Physics, Genera…Read more
  •  464
    Types of Personal Identity
    Cogito 11 (2): 117-122. 1997.
    This is a paper, aimed at students, which sets out some issues regarding personal identity over time.
    Personal Identity, Misc
  •  378
    Principles of composition and criteria of identity
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4). 2006.
    I argue that, despite van Inwagen’s pessimism about the task, it is worth looking for answers to his General Composition Question. Such answers or ‘principles of composition’ tell us about the relationship between an object and its parts. I compare principles of composition with criteria of identity, arguing that, just as different sorts of thing satisfy different criteria of identity, they may satisfy different principles of composition. Variety in criteria of identity is not taken to reflect o…Read more
    MereologyCoincident ObjectsCriteria of Identity
  •  82
    Metaphysics and relativity
    In Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.
    This is a very introductory introduction to some ways in which the special and general theories of relativity may bear upon metaphysical questions about the nature of time and space, and the persistence of objects.
    Physics of TimeTime and ChangePresentismEternalismThree- and Four-Dimensionalism
  •  523
    How things persist
    Oxford University Press. 2001.
    Katherine Hawley explores and compares three theories of persistence -- endurance, perdurance, and stage theories - investigating the ways in which they attempt to account for the world around us. Having provided valuable clarification of its two main rivals, she concludes by advocating stage theory.
    Space and TimeThree- and Four-DimensionalismStage Theory
  •  45
    The Trust Game and the Testimony Game
    Abstracta 6 (S6): 84-91. 2012.
    This is part of a symposium on Paul Faulkner's book 'Knowledge on Trust'. The symposium also includes pieces by Guy Longworth, Arnon Keren, Edward S. Hinchman, and Peter J. Graham, with précis and replies by Paul Faulkner. For a more straightforward account of the book, see my review in Philosophical Quarterly 63.1 (2013), 170-71.
    Epistemology of TestimonyTrust
  •  107
    Review of Empty Ideas (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (Dec 18). 2014.
    A review of Peter Unger's Empty Ideas (OUP 2014)
    The Nature of Analytic PhilosophyThe Nature of Philosophy
  •  433
    Success and Knowledge-How
    American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1). 2003.
    In this paper, I argue that there is a notion of 'counterfactual success' which stands to knowledge how as true belief stands to propositional knowledge. (I attempt to avoid the question of whether knowledge how is a type of propositional knowledge.)
    Knowledge How