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300Two Versions of Hume's LawJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1): 2-7. 2015.Moral conclusions cannot validly be inferred from nonmoral premises – this principle, commonly called “Hume’s law,” presents a conundrum. On one hand, it seems obviously true, and its truth is often simply taken for granted. On the other hand, an ingenious argument by A. N. Prior seems to refute it. My aim here is a resolution. I shall argue, first, that Hume’s law is ambiguous, admitting both a strong and a weak interpretation; second, that the strong interpretation is false, as shown by Prior’…Read more
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122Two kinds of holism about valuesPhilosophical Quarterly 57 (228). 2007.I compare two kinds of holism about values: G.E. Moore's 'organic unities', and Jonathan Dancy's 'value holism'. I propose a simple formal model for representing evaluations of parts and wholes. I then define two conditions, additivism and invariabilism, which together imply a third, atomism. Since atomism is absurd, we must reject one of the former two conditions. This is where Moore and Dancy part company: whereas Moore rejects additivism, Dancy rejects invariabilism. I argue that Moore's view…Read more
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1022Consequentialize ThisEthics 121 (4): 749-771. 2011.To 'consequentialise' is to take a putatively non-consequentialist moral theory and show that it is actually just another form of consequentialism. Some have speculated that every moral theory can be consequentialised. If this were so, then consequentialism would be empty; it would have no substantive content. As I argue here, however, this is not so. Beginning with the core consequentialist commitment to 'maximising the good', I formulate a precise definition of consequentialism and demonstrate…Read more
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London School of EconomicsDepartment of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific MethodAssistant Professor
London, London, City of, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |