Australian National University
School of Philosophy
PhD, 2005
London, London, City of, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics
  •  315
    A good life, or a life worth living, is a one that is "better than nothing". At least that is a common thought. But it is puzzling. What does "nothing" mean here? It cannot be a quantifier in the familiar sense, yet nor, it seems, can it be a referring term. To what could it refer? This paper aims to resolve the puzzle by examining a number of analyses of the concept of a life worth living. Temporal analyses, which exploit the temporal structure of lives, are distinguished from non-temporal ones…Read more
  •  381
    Still No Redundant Properties: Reply to Wielenberg
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3): 1-6. 2012.
    No abstract.
  •  74
    Prioritarianism for Variable Populations
    Philosophical Studies 134 (3): 325-361. 2007.
    Philosophical discussions of prioritarianism, the view that we ought to give priority to those who are worse off, have hitherto been almost exclusively focused on cases involving a fixed population. The aim of this paper is to extend the discussion of prioritarianism to encompass also variable populations. I argue that prioritarianism, in its simplest formulation, is not tenable in this area. However, I also propose several revised formulations that, so I argue, show more promise.