Australian National University
School of Philosophy
PhD, 2005
London, London, City of, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics
  •  421
    Minding the Is-Ought Gap
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1): 53-69. 2014.
    The ‘No Ought From Is’ principle (or ‘NOFI’) states that a valid argument cannot have both an ethical conclusion and non-ethical premises. Arthur Prior proposed several well-known counterexamples, including the following: Tea-drinking is common in England; therefore, either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot. My aim in this paper is to defend NOFI against Prior’s counterexamples. I propose two novel interpretations of NOFI and prove that both are true
  •  119
    I can't make you worship me
    Ratio 18 (2). 2005.
    This paper argues that Divine Command Theory is inconsistent with the veiw, held by many theists, that we have a moral obligation to worship God.
  •  300
    Two Versions of Hume's Law
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1): 2-7. 2015.
    Moral conclusions cannot validly be inferred from nonmoral premises – this principle, commonly called “Hume’s law,” presents a conundrum. On one hand, it seems obviously true, and its truth is often simply taken for granted. On the other hand, an ingenious argument by A. N. Prior seems to refute it. My aim here is a resolution. I shall argue, first, that Hume’s law is ambiguous, admitting both a strong and a weak interpretation; second, that the strong interpretation is false, as shown by Prior’…Read more