Fritz Allhoff, J.D., Ph.D.

_Food & Philosophy_ offers a collection of essays which explore a range of philosophical topics related to food; it joins _Wine & Philosophy_ and _Beer & Philosophy_ in in the "Epicurean Trilogy." Essays are organized thematically and written by philosophers, food writers, and professional chefs. Provides a critical reflection on what and how we eat can contribute to a robust enjoyment of gastronomic pleasures A thoughtful, yet playful collection which emphasizes the importance of food as a proper object of philosophical reflection in its own right.

There are a range of ethical issues that confront physicians in times of war, as well as some of the uses of physicians during wars. This book presents a theoretical apparatus which undergirds those debates, namely by casting physicians as being confronted with dual-loyalties during times of war. While this theoretical apparatus has already been developed in other contexts, it has not been specifically brought to bear on the ethical conflicts that attain in wars. Arguably, wars thrust physicians into ethical conflicts insofar as these wars create a tension between a physician's obligation to heal and an obligation to serve some other good (e.g., military chain of command, national security, the greater good, etc.). Alternatively, we can debate whether this conception is appropriate. For example, one could argue that that non-medical duties cannot attach to physicians (e.g., due to nonoverlapping spheres of justice), thus abrogating the dual-loyalty challenge. Or else one could argue that these medically-trained personnel do not act qua physicians at all (but rather partisan advocates) and therefore duties that would otherwise attach to physicians do not attach here. In the first part of this book, these issues are debated. In the second part of the book, the dual-loyalities frame is used to explore various substantive debates that obtain when the military makes use of physicians. Physician involvement in torture is a heated topic, and certainly the most visible element of the debate. Also, however, we could use the dual-loyalties framework to explore issues in other arenas, such as: development of chemical and biological weapons, medical neutrality/battlefield triage, and so on. In each of these cases, the same tensions arguably exist: physicians have duties both to their patients and elsewhere (which, depending on the details of the view, could be any of the above-mentioned ends).

In this paper, I argue for the permissibility of torture in idealized cases by application of separation of cases: if torture is permissible given any of the dominant moral theories (and if one of those is correct), then torture is permissible simpliciter and I can discharge the tricky business of trying to adjudicate among conflicting moral views. To be sure, torture is not permissible on all the dominant moral theories as at least Kantianism will prove especially recalcitrant to granting moral license of torture, even in idealized cases. Rather than let the Kantian derail my central argument, I directly argue against Kantianism (and other views with similar commitments) on the grounds that, if they cannot accommodate the intuitions in ticking time-bomb cases, they simply cannot be plausible moral views—these arguments come in both foundationalist and coherentist strains. Finally, I postulate that, even if this paper has dealt with idealized cases, it paves the way for the justification of torture in the real world by removing some candidate theories (e.g., Kantianism) and allowing others that both could and are likely to justify real-world torture.

So-called evolutionary error theorists, such as Michael Ruse and Richard Joyce, have argued that naturalistic accounts of the moral sentiments lead us to adopt an error theory approach to morality. Roughly, the argument is that an appreciation of the etiology of those sentiments undermines any reason to think that they track moral truth and, furthermore, undermines any reason to think that moral truth actually exists. I argue that this approach offers us a false dichotomy between error theory and some form of moral realism. While accepting the presuppositions of the evolutionary error theorist, I argue that contract-based approaches to morality can be sensitive to those presuppositions while still vindicating morality. Invoking Stephen Darwall’s distinction between contractualism and contractarianism, I go on to offer an evolutionary-based contractarianism.

This new Handbook offers a comprehensive overview of contemporary extensions and alternatives to the just war tradition in the field of the ethics of war. The modern history of just war has typically assumed the primacy of four particular elements: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, the state actor, and the solider. This book will put these four elements under close scrutiny, and will explore how they fare given the following challenges: • What role do the traditional elements of jus ad bellum and jus in bello—and the constituent principles that follow from this distinction—play in modern warfare? Do they adequately account for a normative theory of war? • What is the role of the state in warfare? Is it or should it be the primary actor in just war theory? • Can a just war be understood simply as a response to territorial aggression between state actors, or should other actions be accommodated under legitimate recourse to armed conflict? • Is the idea of combatant qua state-employed soldier a valid ethical characterization of actors in modern warfare? • What role does the technological backdrop of modern warfare play in understanding and realizing just war theories? Over the course of three key sections, the contributors examine these challenges to the just war tradition in a way that invigorates existing discussions and generates new debate on topical and prospective issues in just war theory. This book will be of great interest to students of just war theory, war and ethics, peace and conflict studies, philosophy and security studies.