Fritz Allhoff, J.D., Ph.D.

In "Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge Informed by Genetics," Judy Illes and Eric Racine argue that "traditional bioethics analysis" (TBA) is insufficient to deal with moral and metaphysical challenges endemic to recent developments in neuroscience, apparently because they believe that these developments differ in kind, not merely degree, from previous developments. This article suggests that recent neuroscientific developments do not have any metaphysical implications that pose the sort of challenge with which Illes and Racine are concerned. Illes and Racine's view fails because of two faulty metaphysical assumptions: first, the assumption that the mind is the brain; and second, the assumption that neurotechnology has implications for questions related to personal identity.

The general consensus among philosophers is that the use of torture is never justified. In _Terrorism, Ticking Time-Bombs, and Torture_, Fritz Allhoff demonstrates the weakness of the case against torture; while allowing that torture constitutes a moral wrong, he nevertheless argues that, in exceptional cases, it represents the lesser of two evils. Allhoff does not take this position lightly. He begins by examining the way terrorism challenges traditional norms, discussing the morality of various practices of torture, and critically exploring the infamous ticking time-bomb scenario. After carefully considering these issues from a purely philosophical perspective, he turns to the empirical ramifications of his arguments, addressing criticisms of torture and analyzing the impact its adoption could have on democracy, institutional structures, and foreign policy. The crucial questions of how to justly authorize torture and how to set limits on its use make up the final section of this timely, provocative, and carefully argued book.

This paper offers a brief examination of ethical health issues arising from military operations and outlines which, if any, of these ethical health issues apply to current Australian Defence Force (ADF) military operations. The transparency of military operations provided through real time global media reporting and the Internet, has raised public awareness of incidents that can be viewed broadly as ethical issues or dilemmas. While many of these issues are not new, it is the changing context of post cold war military operations and scale and demand of humanitarian operations that places new requirements on how the ADF best addresses these potential issues before they become critical incidents. In identifying potential ethical issues arising from military health operations, it is recognized that military health personnel operate within a command and control organizational structure and associated culture. It is also recognized that the complexity of the issues and the environment within which military health personnel are expected to operate will raise ethical health issues not likely to be encountered to the same degree by those health practitioners operating in the average suburban practice or hospital, except when health personnel are confronted with large scale emergencies, such as those encountered with recent terrorist attacks and massacres.

In "Rethinking Research Ethics," Rosamond Rhodes argues that everyone has a responsibility to participate in research ethics programs (Rhodes 2005). After discussing the moral underpinnings upon which such a claim might rest, this article brings up two concerns in response to Rhodes' claim. The first worry is pragmatic: Rhodes argues that the focus in research ethics should be on the hypothetical consent of idealized moral agents, an approach that is constrained by practical considerations. The second objection is that, in most research studies, participants are paid, which undermines the accusation of free-riding for non-participants.

In this paper, I have two main goals. First, I will argue that traditional medical values mandate, as opposed to forbid, at least minimal physician participation in hostile interrogations. Second, I will argue that traditional medical duties or responsibilities do not apply to medically-trained interrogators. In support of this conclusion, I will argue that medically-trained interrogators could simply choose not to enter into a patient-physician relationship. Recognizing that this argument might not be convincing, I will then propose three further arguments against the claim that medical knowledge creates special duties: the logical argument, the metaphysical argument, and the argument from analogy. Finally, I will argue that invocations of role-differentiated morality, professionalism, and oaths could not circumvent the central argumentation of this paper