Laurence McCullough

Managed care employs two business tools of managed practice that raise important ethical issues: paying physicians in ways that impose conflicts of interest on them; and regulating physicians' clinical judgment, decision making, and behavior. The literature on the clinical ethics of managed care has begun to develop rapidly in the past several years. Professional organizations of physicians have made important contributions to this literature. The statements on ethical issues in managed care of four such organizations are considered here, the American Medical Association, the American College of Physicians, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the American Academy of Pediatrics. Three themes common to these statements are identified and critically assessed: the primacy of meeting the medical needs of each individual patient; disclosure of conflicts of interest in how physicians are paid; and opposition to gag orders. The paper concludes with an argument for a basic concept in the clinical ethics of managed care: physicians and institutions as economically disciplined moral co-fiduciaries of populations of patients.

On February 3, 2010, a “Letter of Concern from Bioethicists,” organized by fetaldex.org, was sent to report suspected violations of the ethics of human subjects research in the off-label use of dexamethasone during pregnancy by Dr. Maria New. Copies of this letter were submitted to the FDA Office of Pediatric Therapeutics, the Department of Health and Human Services Office for Human Research Protections, and three universities where Dr. New has held or holds appointments. We provide a critical appraisal of the Letter of Concern and show that it makes false claims, misrepresents scientific publications and websites, fails to meet standards of evidence-based reasoning, makes undocumented claims, treats as settled matters what are, instead, ongoing controversies, offers “mere opinion” as a substitute for argument, and makes contradictory claims. The Letter of Concern is a case study in unethical transgressive bioethics. We call on fetaldex.org to withdraw the letter and for co-signatories to withdraw their approval of it.

An orthodoxy has arisen which claims that there is a crisis in the United States health care system such that the system needs to be reformed. This essay challenges that orthodoxy by showing that we do not have a health care system in the United States. We have a non-system of health care, just as we do for virtually all basic social institutions. Challenging the current orthodoxy surfaces two ethical issues that have been ignored: creating a health care system will (a) cause resurgent paternalism and (b) pose a threat to moral pluralism. Keywords: Health care policy, managed care, paternalism, moral pluralism, institutional integrity, total quality management, continuous quality improvement CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

Clinical ethics, like bioethics more generally, until recently has tended to focus on the present and future, with little attention to the history of moral thought about health care that preceded bioethics. As a consequence, clinical ethics and bioethics lack maturity as fields of the humanities. The papers in this year's clinical ethics issue of the Journal put contemporary clinical ethics in critical dialogue with the past, making the former accountable to the latter. The six papers in this issue of the Journal are briefly described, with an emphasis on how they contribute to the maturation of clinical ethics as a field of the humanities.

This article comments on the treatment of critical-care ethics in four preceding articles about critical-care medicine and its ethical challenges in mainland China, Hong Kong, Japan, and the Philippines. These articles show how cultural values can be in both synchrony and conflict in generating these ethical challenges and in the constraints that they place on the response of critical-care ethics to them. To prevent ethical conflict in critical care the author proposes a two-step approach to the ethical jus tification of critical-care management: (1) the decision to resuscitate and initiate critical-care management, which is based on the obligation to prevent imminent mortality without permanent loss of consciousness; and (2) the decision to continue critical-care management, which is based on the obligation both to prevent imminent death without permanent loss of consciousness and to avoid unnecessary, significant iatrogenic costs to the patient and psychosocial costs to the family when the reduction of morta lity risk is marginal. Physicians and hospitals should restore the critical-care physician's authority and power - against prevailing cultural values, if necessary - to control when critical-care intervention is offered, when it is recommended to continue, and when it is recommended to be discontinued and the patient allowed to die.

Moral concerns about the authority, power, and trustworthiness of physicians have become important topics in clinical ethics during the past three decades. These concerns have come to greater prominence with the increasing involvement of large-scale private institutions in the organization and delivery of medical services, especially managed care organizations, and with the increasing involvement of government in the payment for and organization and delivery of medical services. When physicians act as the agents of large institutions or governments, the power of physicians over their patients increases. The purposes of this article are (1) to reflect briefly on the historical origins of the moral problem of physicians' power in medicine, and (2) to introduce the articles in the 1999 annual number of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy on topics in clinical ethics.

In diesem Aufsatz zeige ich, wie Leibniz' spätere Philosophie auf seine frühen Arbeiten und auf die spätscholastische Philosophie, insbesondere den Nominalismus von Suarez, zurückgreift. Zunächst behaupte ich, daß Leibniz Suarez' Ontologie der Relationen ebenso wie seine Auffassung der Begriffe, des Besonderen und des Allgemeinen übernommen hat. Ich verwende die Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung, um einige Hauptthemen der Leibnizschen Philosophie (die Theorie der Monaden und ihrer individuellen Begriffe, die Kategorienlehre, die Wahrheitstheorie, die unendliche Analyse und das principium indiscernibilium) zu erklären. Dieser Aufsatz soll die traditionelle Prägung von einem großen Teil des Leibnizschen Denkens aufzeigen und die Frage neu stellen: In welchem Sinne ist Leibniz ein Philosoph der modernen Tradition?

Philosophy textbooks typically treat bioethics as a form of "applied ethics"-i.e., an attempt to apply a moral theory, like utilitarianism, to controversial ethical issues in biology and medicine. Historians, however, can find virtually no cases in which applied philosophical moral theory influenced ethical practice in biology or medicine. In light of the absence of historical evidence, the authors of this paper advance an alternative model of the historical relationship between philosophical ethics and medical ethics, the appropriation model. They offer two historical case studies to illustrate the ways in which physicians have "appropriated" concepts and theory fragments from philosophers, and demonstrate how appropriated moral philosophy profoundly influenced the way medical morality was conceived and practiced.

Contrarian ways of thinking are generally good for the intellectual life and clinical ethics is no exception. This essay introduces the papers in the 2003 issue on clinical ethics of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy , each of which goes against the grain in interesting and important ways. Considerations of identity predominate, in discussions of cloning, separation of conjoined twins, and the coming into existence of human beings. Whether viewing organ donation as admirable sacrifice is an altogether good thing is considered, as is the justification of fetal craniotomy. Finally, there is a review essay about From Chance to Choice , an important new book for the philosophy and ethics of molecular medicine.

Physicians make some medical decisions without disclosure to their patients. Nondisclosure is possible because these are silent decisions to refrain from screening, diagnostic or therapeutic interventions. Nondisclosure is ethically permissible when the usual presumption that the patient should be involved in decisions is defeated by considerations of clinical utility or patient emotional and physical well-being. Some silent decisions—not all—are ethically justified by this standard. Justified silent decisions are typically dependent on the physician's professional judgment, experience and knowledge, and are not likely to be changed by patient preferences. We condemn the inappropriate exclusion of the patient from the decision-making process. However, if a test or treatment is unlikely to yield a net benefit, disclosure and discussion are at times unnecessary. Appropriate silent decisions are ethically justified by such considerations as patient benefit or economy of time.

Some problems that arise in the account given by Thomasma and Pellegrino [6] of the foundations of medical ethics in a philosophy of medicine are addressed, in particular questions of a conceptual character about treating therelatum of medicine as health. Which concept of health is appropriate and which will bear the burden of the position thomasma and Pellegrino advance? It is argued that the proper relationship of medicine is one between a healer and developing embodied minds. As a consequence, the project of providing a univocal account of the nature of medicine fails. Instead, pluralism infects philosophy and medicine, resulting in different philosophies of medicine. From these philosophies of medicine will follow not a single medical ethics but a variety.

Despite its prominence in the abortion debate and in public policy, the discourse of 'unborn patient' has not been subjected to critical scrutiny. We provide a critical analysis in three steps. First, we distinguish between the descriptive and normative meanings of 'unborn child.' There is a long history of the descriptive use of 'unborn child.' Second, we argue that the concept of an unborn child has normative content but that this content does not do the work that opponents of abortion want it to do, namely, to establish the independent moral status of fetuses and their rights, the right to life in particular. Third, we argue that the normative content of 'unborn child' should be dependent moral status, not independent moral status. We conclude that the ethical concept of the fetus as a patient should replace the discourse of “unborn child” when that phrase is used normatively