Bert Gordijn

Definition of the Problem: The ethical debate on the cloning of human beings is by no means new. Its history goes back to the middle of the 1960s. However, the theoretical level of the contents of this debate still doesn't seem to have got past its initial stages.Arguments and conclusion: First, a short overview will be given of these 30 years of history of ethical debate, and some central concepts will be explained. Subsequently a critical analysis will be made of the arguments for and against the cloning of people which are used in this debate. The intention of this exposition is to stimulate further ethical discussion on the cloning of human beings

The field of medicine is generally greeted with great enthusiasm. This can be witnessed in the immense support for medical progress, which is widely hoped to lead to a realization of idealized goals. Indeed, with the help of medicine the human body would be controllable and constructible, human nature perfectible. However, enthusiasm in favor of medical progress is first and foremost a sentiment and, like all sentiments, not necessarily a product of rational contemplation. People are capable of enthusing about the realization of utopian notions, such as life without disease or with the perfect body, without requiring any concrete arguments to back them up. Enthusiasm alone is not a guarantee of ethical desirability, however. Hence, this book takes a closer look at four research fields often referred to in medical utopian literature: 'tissue engineering', 'bioelectronics', 'germ line genome modification' and 'interventions in the biological aging process'. They serve as a basis for analyzing whether ethical arguments can be found to support the euphoric advocacy of the further development of these fields.

In this paper the moral responsibility of a Healthcare Organization (HCO) is conceived as an inextricable aspect of the identity of the HCO. We attempt to show that by exploring this relation a more profound insight in moral responsibility can be gained. Referring to Charles Taylor we explore the meaning of the concept of identity. It consists of three interdependent dimensions: a moral, a dialogical, and a narrative one. In section two we develop some additional arguments to apply his concept of personal identity to organizations. The final section works out the relationship of three dimensions of identity to some actual issues in contemporary HCOs: the tension between care and justice, the importance of dialogues about the diversity of goods, and the relevance of becoming familiar with the life-story of the HCO. Identity of an HCO is established and developed in commitments to and identification with certain goods that are central for a HCO. However, many of these goods are interwoven with everyday practices and policies. Therefore, moral responsibility asks for articulation of goods that often stay implicit and should not be reduced to a merely procedural approach. However difficult this articulation may be, if it is not tried at all HCOs run the risk of drifting away from their very identity as healthcare institutions: to offer care to patients and to do this in accordance with demands of social justice.

Autonomy seems to be a core issue for lifelogging technology as it can influence our understanding as well as our personal freedom but a comprehensive discussion on the effect of it on the autonomy of the lifelogger and others affected seems still missing in the current academic debate. In this article we provide a preliminary inquiry into this topic. First, the concept of lifelogging will be briefly clarified. In a lifelog, different data sources are combined in an archive that can be used to retrieve information about the lifelogger and the environment in which the lifelogger is situated. Second, we will discuss the effect of lifelogs on an element of autonomy, namely understanding. Lifelogs can both advance understanding as well as hinder it. Information of lifelogs is the result of social processes that can bias information and can be used to manipulate lifeloggers. Third, we will discuss another aspect of autonomy, namely being free from controlling influences. Also on this level the effect of lifelogs is ambiguous. Fourth, we will discuss the conditions under which prospective lifelogger become lifeloggers. By discussing both the effect of lifelogs on autonomy as well as joining the community of lifeloggers we aim to show the many ways in which lifelogs can compromise and advance autonomy. Fifth, some recommendations are provided that aim to address the above mentioned concerns.

In this book, developed by a group of collaborating scholars in bioethics from different European countries, an overview is given of the most salient themes in present-day bioethics. The themes are discussed in order to enable the reader to have an in-depth overview of the state of the art in bioethics. Introductory chapters will guide the reader through the relevant dimensions of a particular area, while subsequent case discussions will help the reader to apply the ethical theories to specific clinical problems and health policy queries. The book focuses on perspectives typical for the European context. This highlights not only particular bioethical themes such as social justice, choices in health care, and health policy (e.g., in post-communist countries), it also emphasizes specific approaches in ethical theory, in relation to Continental philosophies such as phenomenology and hermeneutics. Because of its articulation of what is typical for the European health care setting as well as for bioethical debate, this book is unique in comparison to existing textbooks in bioethics. The book is an introductory textbook acquainting the reader with the major issues in present-day health care as well as the various theoretical and practical approaches to clarify these issues.

Nanotechnology is a swiftly developing field of technology that is believed to have the potential of great upsides and excessive downsides. In the ethical debate there has been a strong tendency to strongly focus on either the first or the latter. As a consequence ethical assessments of nanotechnology tend to radically diverge. Optimistic visionaries predict truly utopian states of affairs. Pessimistic thinkers present all manner of apocalyptic visions. Whereas the utopian views follow from one-sidedly focusing on the potential benefits of nanotechnology, the apocalyptic perspectives result from giving exclusive attention to possible worst-case scenarios. These radically opposing evaluations hold the risk of conflicts and unwanted backlashes. Furthermore, many of these drastic views are based on simplified and outdated visions of a nanotechnology dominated by self-replicating assemblers and nanomachines. Hence, the present state of the ethical debate on nanotechnology calls for the development of more balanced and better-informed assessments. As a first step in this direction this contribution presents a new method of framing the ethical debate on nanotechnology. Thus, the focus of this paper is on methodology, not on normative analysis.

The rapid evolution of information, communication and entertainment technologies will transform the lives of citizens and ultimately transform society. This paper focuses on ethical issues associated with the likely convergence of virtual realities and social networks, hereafter VRSNs. We examine a scenario in which a significant segment of the world’s population has a presence in a VRSN. Given the pace of technological development and the popularity of these new forms of social interaction, this scenario is plausible. However, it brings with it ethical problems. Two central ethical issues are addressed: those of privacy and those of autonomy. VRSNs pose threats to both privacy and autonomy. The threats to privacy can be broadly categorized as threats to informational privacy, threats to physical privacy, and threats to associational privacy. Each of these threats is further subdivided. The threats to autonomy can be broadly categorized as threats to freedom, to knowledge and to authenticity. Again, these three threats are divided into subcategories. Having categorized the main threats posed by VRSNs, a number of recommendations are provided so that policy-makers, developers, and users can make the best possible use of VRSNs

This article discusses the latest developments regarding euthanasia and palliative care in the Netherlands. On the one hand, a legally codified practice of euthanasia has been established. On the other hand, there has been a strong development of palliative care. The combination of these simultaneous processes seems to be rather unique. This contribution first focuses on these remarkable developments. Subsequently, the analysis concentrates on the question of how these new developments have influenced the ethical debate.

Diese philosophische Arbeit behandelt das Problem der Bestimmung von Grenzen der Person. Sie kritisiert zwei Aspekte der seit J. Locke bestehenden Debatte uber das Problem der Personenidentitat: zum einen die Unzulanglichkeit der Formulierung des Problems, zum anderen das Fehlen einer soliden Theorie uber die Person als Grundlage der Debatte. Zur Behebung der entdeckten Unzulanglichkeit wird eine adaquate Formulierung des Problems entwickelt. Sie erfasst das Problem mit Hilfe des Begriffs der Grenze der Person. Dem zweiten Kritikpunkt wird dadurch begegnet, dass eine fundierte Theorie uber die Person aufgestellt wird. Die Analyse des Problems auf der Grundlage der entwickelten Theorie zeigt schliesslich die Unmoglichkeit einer wohlbegrundeten Bestimmung von Grenzen der Person auf."

In pluralistic modern societies, moral dissent will, to an increasing extent, be an inescapable fact in our lives. Moral dissent, however, involves various serious dangers: escalation of conflicts, the use of violence, flourishing of radical extremism and even civil war. There are basically two ways in which these threats can be addressed: coercive enforcement of consensus or tolerance. First, we could try to eliminate moral dissent by using more dictatorial forms of consensus formation, like propaganda, indoctrination and terror. This, however, would endanger or even destroy the open society. Therefore, from a moral point of view, tolerance appears to be the more desirable antidote to the unwanted effects of moral dissent. This paper aims to contribute to the discussions about the regulation of moral dissent and the formation of moral consensus by analyzing one of the most important and idiosyncratic elements of the Dutch way of handling these issues: pragmatic tolerance. First, some general thoughts are developed about moral consensus, moral dissent and tolerance as a means of regulating dissent. In addition, the characteristic Dutch policy of pragmatic tolerance is described. Finally, some of the pros and cons of pragmatic tolerance are analyzed from an ethical perspective.