Bert Gordijn

Diese philosophische Arbeit behandelt das Problem der Bestimmung von Grenzen der Person. Sie kritisiert zwei Aspekte der seit J. Locke bestehenden Debatte uber das Problem der Personenidentitat: zum einen die Unzulanglichkeit der Formulierung des Problems, zum anderen das Fehlen einer soliden Theorie uber die Person als Grundlage der Debatte. Zur Behebung der entdeckten Unzulanglichkeit wird eine adaquate Formulierung des Problems entwickelt. Sie erfasst das Problem mit Hilfe des Begriffs der Grenze der Person. Dem zweiten Kritikpunkt wird dadurch begegnet, dass eine fundierte Theorie uber die Person aufgestellt wird. Die Analyse des Problems auf der Grundlage der entwickelten Theorie zeigt schliesslich die Unmoglichkeit einer wohlbegrundeten Bestimmung von Grenzen der Person auf."

In pluralistic modern societies, moral dissent will, to an increasing extent, be an inescapable fact in our lives. Moral dissent, however, involves various serious dangers: escalation of conflicts, the use of violence, flourishing of radical extremism and even civil war. There are basically two ways in which these threats can be addressed: coercive enforcement of consensus or tolerance. First, we could try to eliminate moral dissent by using more dictatorial forms of consensus formation, like propaganda, indoctrination and terror. This, however, would endanger or even destroy the open society. Therefore, from a moral point of view, tolerance appears to be the more desirable antidote to the unwanted effects of moral dissent. This paper aims to contribute to the discussions about the regulation of moral dissent and the formation of moral consensus by analyzing one of the most important and idiosyncratic elements of the Dutch way of handling these issues: pragmatic tolerance. First, some general thoughts are developed about moral consensus, moral dissent and tolerance as a means of regulating dissent. In addition, the characteristic Dutch policy of pragmatic tolerance is described. Finally, some of the pros and cons of pragmatic tolerance are analyzed from an ethical perspective.

This paper explores the relevance of the debate about ethical expertise for the practice of clinical ethics. We present definitions, explain three theories of ethical expertise, and identify arguments that have been brought up to either support the concept of ethical expertise or call it into question. Finally, we discuss four theses: the debate is relevant for the practice of clinical ethics in that it (1) improves and specifies clinical ethicists' perception of their expertise; (2) contributes to improving the perception of moral competence of non-ethicists; (3) gives insight into complementary styles of argumentation of ethicists and non-ethicists; and (4) contributes to the awareness of the problem of profession-building of (clinical) ethicists.

Introducing a special issue of a journal is a difficult, but pleasurable task for any editor. One must chose what to say about the themes of the issue, and how to introduce the papers presented. However, this task becomes still more complex when the special issue in question forms the inaugural issue of a new journal. This is the case here as we find ourselves introducing "Questions in Human Enhancement" as the inaugural issue of Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology. As such, this editorial serves two purposes: first we must introduce the journal itself, exploring our motivations for creating a new, quasi-open access, interdisciplinary publishing forum; and second we must introduce a stunning collection of comments, articles and discussion papers that have been written by a range of eminent scholars from across the globe.