Bert Gordijn

Nanotechnology is a swiftly developing field of technology that is believed to have the potential of great upsides and excessive downsides. In the ethical debate there has been a strong tendency to strongly focus on either the first or the latter. As a consequence ethical assessments of nanotechnology tend to radically diverge. Optimistic visionaries predict truly utopian states of affairs. Pessimistic thinkers present all manner of apocalyptic visions. Whereas the utopian views follow from one-sidedly focusing on the potential benefits of nanotechnology, the apocalyptic perspectives result from giving exclusive attention to possible worst-case scenarios. These radically opposing evaluations hold the risk of conflicts and unwanted backlashes. Furthermore, many of these drastic views are based on simplified and outdated visions of a nanotechnology dominated by self-replicating assemblers and nanomachines. Hence, the present state of the ethical debate on nanotechnology calls for the development of more balanced and better-informed assessments. As a first step in this direction this contribution presents a new method of framing the ethical debate on nanotechnology. Thus, the focus of this paper is on methodology, not on normative analysis.

The rapid evolution of information, communication and entertainment technologies will transform the lives of citizens and ultimately transform society. This paper focuses on ethical issues associated with the likely convergence of virtual realities and social networks, hereafter VRSNs. We examine a scenario in which a significant segment of the world’s population has a presence in a VRSN. Given the pace of technological development and the popularity of these new forms of social interaction, this scenario is plausible. However, it brings with it ethical problems. Two central ethical issues are addressed: those of privacy and those of autonomy. VRSNs pose threats to both privacy and autonomy. The threats to privacy can be broadly categorized as threats to informational privacy, threats to physical privacy, and threats to associational privacy. Each of these threats is further subdivided. The threats to autonomy can be broadly categorized as threats to freedom, to knowledge and to authenticity. Again, these three threats are divided into subcategories. Having categorized the main threats posed by VRSNs, a number of recommendations are provided so that policy-makers, developers, and users can make the best possible use of VRSNs

This article discusses the latest developments regarding euthanasia and palliative care in the Netherlands. On the one hand, a legally codified practice of euthanasia has been established. On the other hand, there has been a strong development of palliative care. The combination of these simultaneous processes seems to be rather unique. This contribution first focuses on these remarkable developments. Subsequently, the analysis concentrates on the question of how these new developments have influenced the ethical debate.

Diese philosophische Arbeit behandelt das Problem der Bestimmung von Grenzen der Person. Sie kritisiert zwei Aspekte der seit J. Locke bestehenden Debatte uber das Problem der Personenidentitat: zum einen die Unzulanglichkeit der Formulierung des Problems, zum anderen das Fehlen einer soliden Theorie uber die Person als Grundlage der Debatte. Zur Behebung der entdeckten Unzulanglichkeit wird eine adaquate Formulierung des Problems entwickelt. Sie erfasst das Problem mit Hilfe des Begriffs der Grenze der Person. Dem zweiten Kritikpunkt wird dadurch begegnet, dass eine fundierte Theorie uber die Person aufgestellt wird. Die Analyse des Problems auf der Grundlage der entwickelten Theorie zeigt schliesslich die Unmoglichkeit einer wohlbegrundeten Bestimmung von Grenzen der Person auf."

In pluralistic modern societies, moral dissent will, to an increasing extent, be an inescapable fact in our lives. Moral dissent, however, involves various serious dangers: escalation of conflicts, the use of violence, flourishing of radical extremism and even civil war. There are basically two ways in which these threats can be addressed: coercive enforcement of consensus or tolerance. First, we could try to eliminate moral dissent by using more dictatorial forms of consensus formation, like propaganda, indoctrination and terror. This, however, would endanger or even destroy the open society. Therefore, from a moral point of view, tolerance appears to be the more desirable antidote to the unwanted effects of moral dissent. This paper aims to contribute to the discussions about the regulation of moral dissent and the formation of moral consensus by analyzing one of the most important and idiosyncratic elements of the Dutch way of handling these issues: pragmatic tolerance. First, some general thoughts are developed about moral consensus, moral dissent and tolerance as a means of regulating dissent. In addition, the characteristic Dutch policy of pragmatic tolerance is described. Finally, some of the pros and cons of pragmatic tolerance are analyzed from an ethical perspective.

This paper explores the relevance of the debate about ethical expertise for the practice of clinical ethics. We present definitions, explain three theories of ethical expertise, and identify arguments that have been brought up to either support the concept of ethical expertise or call it into question. Finally, we discuss four theses: the debate is relevant for the practice of clinical ethics in that it (1) improves and specifies clinical ethicists' perception of their expertise; (2) contributes to improving the perception of moral competence of non-ethicists; (3) gives insight into complementary styles of argumentation of ethicists and non-ethicists; and (4) contributes to the awareness of the problem of profession-building of (clinical) ethicists.

Introducing a special issue of a journal is a difficult, but pleasurable task for any editor. One must chose what to say about the themes of the issue, and how to introduce the papers presented. However, this task becomes still more complex when the special issue in question forms the inaugural issue of a new journal. This is the case here as we find ourselves introducing "Questions in Human Enhancement" as the inaugural issue of Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology. As such, this editorial serves two purposes: first we must introduce the journal itself, exploring our motivations for creating a new, quasi-open access, interdisciplinary publishing forum; and second we must introduce a stunning collection of comments, articles and discussion papers that have been written by a range of eminent scholars from across the globe.

This contribution focuses on two claims advanced by the proponents of the project of “Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance.” Firstly, it is maintained that this project represents something genuinely new and quite unique. Secondly, it is argued that the future prospects of the project are extraordinarily positive. In order to critically assess both claims this paper first focuses on the question of whether there is actually anything genuinely new about the project of improving human performance by means of converging NBIC technologies. In addition it is analyzed whether the project warrants that we be optimistic about its future prospects