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4Heinrich Hertz and the concept of forceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 29 (1). 1951.This Article does not have an abstract
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67Free will, praise and blameMind 70 (279): 291-306. 1961.In this article I try to refute the so-called "libertarian" theory of free will, and to examine how our conclusion ought to modify our common attitudes of praise and blame. In attacking the libertarian view, I shall try to show that it cannot be consistently stated. That is, my dscussion will be an "analytic-philosophic" one. I shall neglect what I think is in practice an equally powerful method of attack on the libertarian: a challenge to state his theory in such a way that it will fit in the m…Read more
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14Foundations of the Unity of Science. Volume II, no. 7: Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science.International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, I and II (review)Philosophical Review 62 (3): 473. 1953.
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11Explanation—Opening AddressRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 1-19. 1990.It is a pleasure for me to give this opening address to the Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference on ‘Explanation’ for two reasons. The first is that it is succeeded by exciting symposia and other papers concerned with various special aspects of the topic of explanation. The second is that the conference is being held in my old alma mater, the University of Glasgow, where I did my first degree. Especially due to C. A. Campbell and George Brown there was in the Logic Department a big emphasis …Read more
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10Causal Theories of TimeThe Monist 53 (3): 385-395. 1969.This paper expresses certain qualms about causal theories of time, Such as have been put forward by h. Mehlberg and adolf gruenbaum. These qualms arise from doubts about the clarity of the notion of causality. It is suggested that a metalinguistic concept of causality cannot occur within the object language of physics, And that any non-Metalinguistic concept of causality leads to more difficulties than do the concepts of physical geometry which a causal theory of time is supposed to elucidate
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1CARNAP, R.: "The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap"Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (n/a): 84. 1965.
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2Computational processes, representations and propositional attitudesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 97-97. 1980.
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49Critical noticeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2). 1956.Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5
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4Critical noticeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1). 1955.Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5
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4ColoursPhilosophy 36 (April-July): 128-142. 1961.In this paper I wish first of all to argue against two possible views about colour qualities, which I shall label the Objectivist and Subjectivist views respectively. I find these views to be prevalent among philosophers of my acquaintance, though sometimes they are hidden by a veneer of post-Wittgensteinian sophistication. Part of my argument will depend on modern scientific theories of colour vision. In the second part of the paper I shall argue for a different view of my own
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16A note on categoriesBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 4 (15): 227-228. 1953.The relation between categories and sentence frames as presented in ryle's "the concept of mind" is discussed. smart states, "it is important to note that the fact that two expressions 'a' and 'b' "will" go into the same blank in a sentence frame does "not" prove that they are of the same category." (staff)
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12A form of metaphysical realismPhilosophical Quarterly 45 (180): 301-315. 1995.This essay defends a view which is near enough to Putnam's characterization of metaphysical realism for it to be called by the same name. Indeterminacy of reference is conceded, in the sense that there may be multiple reference relations, but it is denied that this implied belief in unknowable noumena. It is enough for metaphysical realism as conceived here, that there be at least one reference relation. The essay also argues against defining truth epistemically. Even a Peircean ideal theory mig…Read more
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3Conditions of Rational Inquiry: A Study in the Philosophy of Value (review)Philosophical Review 72 (1): 104-106. 1963.
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1The Structure of Science. Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (review)Journal of Philosophy 59 (8): 216-223. 1962.
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13Atheism and TheismPhilosophical Review 107 (3): 462. 1998.In this volume, the sixth in Blackwell's Great Debates in Philosophy series, Smart and Haldane discuss the case for and against religious belief. The debate is unusual in beginning with the negative side. After a short jointly authored introduction, there is a fairly extended presentation of the atheist position by Smart. Haldane then offers an equally extended defense of theism. The authors respond to one another in the same order, and the book concludes with a brief co-authored treatment of an…Read more