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22Commentary on MillerProceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 15 (1): 214-230. 1999.
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68Aristotle on Perceiving Objects by Anna MarmodoroJournal of the History of Philosophy 53 (4): 776-777. 2015.The study of Aristotle’s psychology has long been dominated by metaphysical concerns, centering above all on the relation between the soul and the body. For centuries, this was inevitable, given the widespread preoccupation with immortality and considerable puzzlement as to whether Aristotle’s views about the intellect committed him to it or not. But in the twentieth century the soul-body relation has continued to be the main focus, even when talking about perception. The debate over perception …Read more
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167Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest ProposalPhronesis 44 (3): 199-227. 1999.In "De anima" 3.5, Aristotle argues for the existence of a second intellect, the so-called "Agent Intellect." The logical structure of his argument turns on a distinction between different types of soul, rather than different faculties within a given soul; and the attributes he assigns to the second species make it clear that his concern here -- as at the climax of his other great works, such as the "Metaphysics," the "Nicomachean" and the "Eudemian Ethics" -- is the difference between the human…Read more
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35Review of Dorothea Frede (ed.), Brad Inwood (ed.), Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (5). 2006.
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37Colloquium 5Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 16 (1): 135-175. 2000.
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36Aristotle and the Problem of IntentionalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 249-298. 1998.Aristotle not only fonnulates the problem of intentionality explicitly, he makes a solution to it a requirement for any adequate theory of mind. His own solution, however, is not to be found in his theory of sensation, as Brentano and others have thought. In fact, it is precisely because Aristotle regards this theory as inadequate that he goes on to argue for a distinct new ability he calls “phantasia.” The theory of content he develops on this basis (unlike Brentano’s) is profoundly naturalisti…Read more
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2TK Johansen, Aristotle on the Sense-Organs Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 21 (2): 127-129. 2001.
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1Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Alexander MourelatosPhilosophical Quarterly 55 (219): 356-358. 2005.
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200Epiphenomenalisms, ancient and modernPhilosophical Review 106 (3): 309-363. 1997.This debate, I shall argue, has everything to do with Aristotle. Aristotle raises the charge of epiphenomenalism himself against a theory that seems to have close affinities to his own, and he offers what has the makings of an emergentist response. This leads to controversy within his own school. We find opponents ranged on both sides, starting with his own pupils, several of whom are stout defenders of epiphenomenalism, and culminating in the developed emergentism of later commentators. Aristot…Read more
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53Aristotle on the Relation of the Intellect to the Body: Commentary on BroadieProceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 12 (1): 177-192. 1996.
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3Aristotle's Argument for Why the Understanding is not Compounded with the Body'Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 16 135-75. 2000.
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5Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 50 (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2016.Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback.
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527Comment on Amie Thomasson's "self-awareness and self-knowledge"PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.In this paper, I raise an objection to Thomasson
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241Aristotle and the problem of intentionalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 249-298. 1998.Aristotle not only formulates the problem of intentionality explicitly, he makes a solution to it a requirement for any adequate theory of mind. His own solution, however, is not to be found in his theory of sensation, as Brentano and others have thought. In fact, it is precisely because Aristotle regards this theory as inadequate that he goes on to argue for a distinct new ability he calls "phantasia." The theory of content he develops on this basis (unlike Brentano's) is profoundly naturalisti…Read more
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