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5Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 50 (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2016.Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback.
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527Comment on Amie Thomasson's "self-awareness and self-knowledge"PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.In this paper, I raise an objection to Thomasson
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241Aristotle and the problem of intentionalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 249-298. 1998.Aristotle not only formulates the problem of intentionality explicitly, he makes a solution to it a requirement for any adequate theory of mind. His own solution, however, is not to be found in his theory of sensation, as Brentano and others have thought. In fact, it is precisely because Aristotle regards this theory as inadequate that he goes on to argue for a distinct new ability he calls "phantasia." The theory of content he develops on this basis (unlike Brentano's) is profoundly naturalisti…Read more
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33Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and ModernPhilosophical Review 106 (3): 309-363. 1997.This debate, I shall argue, has everything to do with Aristotle. Aristotle raises the charge of epiphenomenalism himself against a theory that seems to have close affinities to his own, and he offers what has the makings of an emergentist response. This leads to controversy within his own school. We find opponents ranged on both sides, starting with his own pupils, several of whom are stout defenders of epiphenomenalism, and culminating in the developed emergentism of later commentators. Aristot…Read more
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5Something and nothing: the Stoics on concepts and universalsOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17 145-213. 1999.
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59Pourquoi aristote a besoin de l'imaginationLes Etudes Philosophiques. forthcoming.Le présent article offre une nouvelle interprétation du concept aristotélicien d' « imagination » ou phantasia par les moyens d'une lecture attentive du Traité de l'âme, III, 3, tout particulièrement de son début. Aristote soutient que ses prédécesseurs ne peuvent expliquer comment l'erreur se produit. Mais c'est également une difficulté pour sa propre explication des formes de base de la perception et de la pensée, et Aristote introduit la phantasia précisément pour répondre à cette question. I…Read more
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27Commentary on Kurt Pritzl: Aristotle on the conditions of thoughtProceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 14 (1): 202-212. 1998.
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406Aristotle on consciousnessMind 111 (444): 751-815. 2002.Aristotle's discussion of perceiving that we perceive has points of contact with two contemporary debates about consciousness: the first over whether consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states or a higher-order thought or perception; the second concerning the qualitative nature of experience. In both cases, Aristotle's views cut down the middle of an apparent dichotomy, in a way that does justice to each set of intuitions, while avoiding their attendant difficulties. With regard to t…Read more
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6The Spirit and the Letter: Aristotle on PerceptionIn Ricardo Salles (ed.), Metaphysics, Soul and Ethics: Themes From the Work of Richard Sorabji, Oxford University Press. pp. 245-320. 2004.
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35Review of David Sedley, Plato's Cratylus (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (7). 2004.
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15Colloquium 6Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 9 (1): 213-245. 1993.
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