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182Selfish ReasonsErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2. 2015.Argues against the rationality of self-concern. Non-instrumental interest in my own well-being is not justified by the fact that it is mine. This follows from the metaphysics of first-person thought, as thought about the object of immediate knowledge. The argument leaves room for rational self-interest as a form of self-love that is justified, like love for others, by the fact of our shared humanity.
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245Murdoch on the Sovereignty of GoodPhilosophers' Imprint 13. 2013.Argues for an interpretation of Iris Murdoch on which her account of moral reasons has Platonic roots, and on which she gives an ontological proof of the reality of the Good. This reading explains the structure of Sovereignty, how Murdoch's claims differ from a focus on "thick moral concepts," and how to find coherent arguments in her book.
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126Reply to Bratman and SmithAnalysis 69 (3): 531-540. 2009.To begin with, I am deeply grateful to Michael Bratman and Michael Smith for their generosity in responding to my book, for the care with which they have read it, and for the challenge of meeting their objections. I am also grateful for their support and encouragement over the years. It is a pleasure to engage with them here.Because their comments raise many related difficulties, this reply will treat them together, beginning with brief consideration of issues in action theory before turning to …Read more
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311Cognitivism about Instrumental ReasonEthics 117 (4): 649-673. 2007.Argues for a "cognitivist" account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.
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164Hume on practical reasonPhilosophical Perspectives 18 (1). 2004.Argues that Hume was a sceptic about practical reason only on a rationalist account of what it would have to be. (This version differs substantially from the published paper.).
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77Wrong-Making ReasonsIn Simon Kirchin (ed.), Reading Parfit, Routledge. pp. 123-134. 2017.Argues that there is a problem of redundancy for Kantian Contractualism in light of plausible claims about the reason-giving force of wrong-making facts.
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333Reasons and CausesEuropean Journal of Philosophy 19 (1): 129-157. 2011.Argues for a causal-psychological account of acting for reasons. This view is distinguished from a more ambitious causal theory of action, clarified as far as possible, and motivated—against non-reductive, teleological, and behaviourist alternatives—on broadly metaphysical grounds
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388Knowledge of intentionIn Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. pp. 170--197. 2011.Argues that it is not by inference from intention that I know what I am doing intentionally. Instead, the reverse is true: groundless knowledge of intention rests on the will as a capacity for non-perceptual, non-inferential knowledge of action. The argument adapts and clarifies considerations of "transparency" more familiar in connection with belief.
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44Review of Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, eds., 'Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge' (review)Mind 118 (472): 834-840. 2009.
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172Intention, Plans, and Ethical RationalismIn Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman, Oxford University Press. pp. 56-82. 2014.Argues from the planning theory of intention – as an account of means-end coherence – to a comprehensive form of ethical rationalism. Having raised objections to this result, the paper ends by sketching a way out.
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124The Ethics of ExistencePhilosophical Perspectives 28 (1): 291-301. 2014.Argues that inadvisable procreative acts should often be affirmed in retrospect. This shift is not explained by attachment or love but by the moral impact of existence.
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258Other PeopleIn Sarah Buss & Nandi Theunissen (eds.), Rethinking the Value of Humanity, Oup Usa. 2023.Argues for the role of personal acquaintance in both love and concern for individuals, as such. The challenge is to say what personal acquaintance is and why it matters in the way it does. These questions are addressed through the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Topics include: the ethics of aggregation, the basis of moral standing, and the value of human life.
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194Reasons without rationalism * by Kieran Setiya * princeton university press, 2007. IX + 131 pp. 22.50: SummaryAnalysis 69 (3): 509-510. 2009.Reasons without Rationalism has two related parts, devoted to action theory and ethics, respectively. In the second part, I argue for a close connection between reasons for action and virtues of character. This connection is mediated by the idea of good practical thought and the disposition to engage in it. The argument relies on the following principle, which is intended as common ground: " Reasons: The fact that p is a reason for A to ϕ just in case A has a collection of psychological states, …Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |