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333Sympathy for the devilIn Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, Oxford University Press. pp. 82--110. 2010.Argues that, while human beings may act "under the guise of the good," this is not true of rational agents, as such. Themes discussed along the way – extending the argument of "Reasons without Rationalism" (Princeton, 2007) – include: desires as appearances of the good, the intelligibility of vice, and the kind of essentialist claim that permits exceptions.
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342Internal ReasonsIn Kieran Setiya & Hille Paakkunainen (eds.), Internal Reasons: Contemporary Readings, Mit Press. 2012.Argues that "internalism about reasons" owes its appeal to a function argument from the nature of agency. Internalism is thus revealed as a species of ethical rationalism. (This paper introduces a volume of recent work on internal and external reasons.)
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36Practical Knowledge: Selected EssaysOxford University Press. 2016.In this collection, Kieran Setiya explores the place of agency in ethics, arguing for a causal theory of intentional action on which it is understood through the knowledge embodied in our intentions, and against the rationalist project of deriving norms of practical reason from the nature of the will.
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88Is efficiency a vice?American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4). 2005.Argues against the form of instrumentalism on which being practically rational is being efficient in the pursuit of one's ends. The trait of means-end efficiency turns out to be a defect of character, and therefore cannot be identified with practical reason at its best.
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286Believing at WillMidwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 36-52. 2008.Argues that we cannot form beliefs at will without failure of attention or logical confusion. The explanation builds on Williams' argument in "Deciding to Believe," attempting to resolve some well-known difficulties. The paper ends with tentative doubts about the idea of judgement as intentional action.
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151Review of Mark Johnston, 'Saving God' and 'Surviving Death' (review)Ethics 121 (2): 476-486. 2011.
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526Love and the Value of a LifePhilosophical Review 123 (3): 251-280. 2014.Argues that there is no one it is irrational to love, that it is rational to act with partiality to those we love, and that the rationality of doing so is not conditional on love. It follows that Anscombe and Taurek are right: you are not required to save three instead of one, even when those you could save are perfect strangers
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76Review of Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet, eds., 'Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality' (review)Philosophical Review 114 (1): 131-135. 2005.
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325Anscombe on Practical KnowledgeIn Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays, Oxford University Press. 2016.Argues that, for Anscombe, 'practical knowledge' is only sometimes 'the cause of what it understands.' It is the formal cause when its object is 'formally the description of an executed intention.' Nor is such knowledge confined to the present progressive: we have practical knowledge of the future and the past.
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38Review of Michael Slote, 'Morals from Motives' (review)Philosophical Review 111 (4): 616-618. 2002.
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595Explaining actionPhilosophical Review 112 (3): 339-393. 2003.Argues that, in acting for a reason, one takes that reason to explain one's action, not to justify it: reasons for acting need not be seen "under the guise of the good". The argument turns on the need to explain the place of "practical knowledge" - knowing what one is doing - in intentional action. A revised and expanded version of this material appears in Part One of "Reasons without Rationalism" (Princeton, 2007).
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607What is a Reason to Act?Philosophical Studies 167 (2): 221-235. 2014.Argues for a conception of reasons as premises of practical reasoning. This conception is applied to questions about ignorance, advice, enabling conditions, "ought," and evidence.
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178RetrospectionPhilosophers' Imprint 16. 2016.Argues from the rationality of nostalgia, affirmation, and regret to a principle of ‘specificity’: it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide us with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist.
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145Transparency and InferenceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2): 263-268. 2012.Argues that doubts about the inference from 'p' to 'I believe that p' do not support reflective theories of self-knowledge over an inferential or rule-following view. (This note is a reply to Matthew Boyle, "Transparent Self-Knowledge," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85: 223-241.)
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303Knowing HowProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3): 285-307. 2012.Argues from the possibility of basic intentional action to a non-propositional theory of knowing how. The argument supports a broadly Anscombean conception of the will as a capacity for practical knowledge.
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47Parfit on direct self-defeatPhilosophical Quarterly 49 (195): 239-242. 1999.In the first part of Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues that common‐sense morality, or M, is self‐defeating, so that it must be rejected or revised. I defend M. We can rebut Parfit’s argument if we make an assumption about the moral importance of doing what is morally right. We need to assume that this end has sufficient weight in M
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64Review of Justin Broackes, ed., 'Iris Murdoch, Philosopher' (review)Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249): 878-881. 2012.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |