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350Murdoch on the Sovereignty of GoodPhilosophers' Imprint 13. 2013.Argues for an interpretation of Iris Murdoch on which her account of moral reasons has Platonic roots, and on which she gives an ontological proof of the reality of the Good. This reading explains the structure of Sovereignty, how Murdoch's claims differ from a focus on "thick moral concepts," and how to find coherent arguments in her book.
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124Practical Knowledge: Selected EssaysOxford University Press. 2016.In this collection, Kieran Setiya explores the place of agency in ethics, arguing for a causal theory of intentional action on which it is understood through the knowledge embodied in our intentions, and against the rationalist project of deriving norms of practical reason from the nature of the will.
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451Anscombe on Practical KnowledgeIn Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays, Oxford University Press. 2016.Argues that, for Anscombe, 'practical knowledge' is only sometimes 'the cause of what it understands.' It is the formal cause when its object is 'formally the description of an executed intention.' Nor is such knowledge confined to the present progressive: we have practical knowledge of the future and the past.
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364IntentionStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2009.Philosophical perplexity about intention begins with its appearance in three guises: intention for the future, as when I intend to complete this entry by the end of the month; the intention with which someone acts, as I am typing with the further intention of writing an introductory sentence; and intentional action, as in the fact that I am typing these words intentionally. As Elizabeth Anscombe wrote in a similar context, ‘it is implausible to say that the word is equivocal as it occurs in thes…Read more
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341Against internalismNoûs 38 (2). 2004.Argues that practical irrationality is akin to moral culpability: it is defective practical thought which one could legitimately have been expected to avoid. It is thus a mistake to draw too tight a connection between failure to be moved by reasons and practical irrationality (as in a certain kind of "internalism"): one's failure may be genuine, but not culpable, and therefore not irrational.
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385Reasons and CausesEuropean Journal of Philosophy 19 (1): 129-157. 2011.Argues for a causal-psychological account of acting for reasons. This view is distinguished from a more ambitious causal theory of action, clarified as far as possible, and motivated—against non-reductive, teleological, and behaviourist alternatives—on broadly metaphysical grounds
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212Review of Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet, eds., 'Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality' (review)Philosophical Review 114 (1): 131-135. 2005.
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433Knowing HowProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3): 285-307. 2012.Argues from the possibility of basic intentional action to a non-propositional theory of knowing how. The argument supports a broadly Anscombean conception of the will as a capacity for practical knowledge.
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173Review of Michael Slote, 'Morals from Motives' (review)Philosophical Review 111 (4): 616-618. 2002.
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435Does Moral Theory Corrupt Youth?Philosophical Topics 38 (1): 205-222. 2010.Argues that the answer is yes. The epistemic assumptions of moral theory deprive us of resources needed to resist the challenge of moral disagreement, which its practice at the same time makes vivid. The paper ends by sketching a kind of epistemology that can respond to disagreement without skepticism: one in which the fundamental standards of justification for moral belief are biased toward the truth
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1048The Midlife CrisisPhilosophers' Imprint 14. 2014.Argues that philosophy can solve the midlife crisis, at least in one of its forms. This crisis turns on the exhaustibility of our ends. The solution is to value ends that are ‘atelic,’ so inexhaustible. Topics include: John Stuart Mill's nervous breakdown; Aristotle on the finality of the highest good; and Schopenhauer on the futility of desire.
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231Transparency and InferenceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2): 263-268. 2012.Argues that doubts about the inference from 'p' to 'I believe that p' do not support reflective theories of self-knowledge over an inferential or rule-following view. (This note is a reply to Matthew Boyle, "Transparent Self-Knowledge," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85: 223-241.)
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429Other PeopleIn Sarah Buss & Nandi Theunissen (eds.) https://philpapers.org/rec/BUSRTV, Oup Usa. 2023.Argues for the role of personal acquaintance in both love and concern for individuals, as such. The challenge is to say what personal acquaintance is and why it matters in the way it does. These questions are addressed through the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Topics include: the ethics of aggregation, the basis of moral standing, and the value of human life.
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147Parfit on direct self-defeatPhilosophical Quarterly 49 (195): 239-242. 1999.In the first part of Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues that common‐sense morality, or M, is self‐defeating, so that it must be rejected or revised. I defend M. We can rebut Parfit’s argument if we make an assumption about the moral importance of doing what is morally right. We need to assume that this end has sufficient weight in M
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450Cognitivism about Instrumental ReasonEthics 117 (4): 649-673. 2007.Argues for a "cognitivist" account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.
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134Is efficiency a vice?American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4). 2005.Argues against the form of instrumentalism on which being practically rational is being efficient in the pursuit of one's ends. The trait of means-end efficiency turns out to be a defect of character, and therefore cannot be identified with practical reason at its best.
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352Believing at WillMidwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 36-52. 2008.Argues that we cannot form beliefs at will without failure of attention or logical confusion. The explanation builds on Williams' argument in "Deciding to Believe," attempting to resolve some well-known difficulties. The paper ends with tentative doubts about the idea of judgement as intentional action.
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212Reply to Bratman and SmithAnalysis 69 (3): 531-540. 2009.To begin with, I am deeply grateful to Michael Bratman and Michael Smith for their generosity in responding to my book, for the care with which they have read it, and for the challenge of meeting their objections. I am also grateful for their support and encouragement over the years. It is a pleasure to engage with them here.Because their comments raise many related difficulties, this reply will treat them together, beginning with brief consideration of issues in action theory before turning to …Read more
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353Knowing Right From WrongOxford University Press. 2012.Can we have objective knowledge of right and wrong, of how we should live and what there is reason to do? Can it be anything but luck when our moral beliefs are true? Kieran Setiya confronts these questions in their most compelling and articulate forms, and argues that if there is objective ethical knowledge, human nature is its source.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Epistemology |
| Philosophy of Action |
| Meta-Ethics |
| Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
| 17th/18th Century Philosophy |