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47Parfit on direct self-defeatPhilosophical Quarterly 49 (195): 239-242. 1999.In the first part of Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues that common‐sense morality, or M, is self‐defeating, so that it must be rejected or revised. I defend M. We can rebut Parfit’s argument if we make an assumption about the moral importance of doing what is morally right. We need to assume that this end has sufficient weight in M
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301Knowing HowProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3): 285-307. 2012.Argues from the possibility of basic intentional action to a non-propositional theory of knowing how. The argument supports a broadly Anscombean conception of the will as a capacity for practical knowledge.
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64Review of Justin Broackes, ed., 'Iris Murdoch, Philosopher' (review)Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249): 878-881. 2012.
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183Selfish ReasonsErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2. 2015.Argues against the rationality of self-concern. Non-instrumental interest in my own well-being is not justified by the fact that it is mine. This follows from the metaphysics of first-person thought, as thought about the object of immediate knowledge. The argument leaves room for rational self-interest as a form of self-love that is justified, like love for others, by the fact of our shared humanity.
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126Reply to Bratman and SmithAnalysis 69 (3): 531-540. 2009.To begin with, I am deeply grateful to Michael Bratman and Michael Smith for their generosity in responding to my book, for the care with which they have read it, and for the challenge of meeting their objections. I am also grateful for their support and encouragement over the years. It is a pleasure to engage with them here.Because their comments raise many related difficulties, this reply will treat them together, beginning with brief consideration of issues in action theory before turning to …Read more
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247Murdoch on the Sovereignty of GoodPhilosophers' Imprint 13. 2013.Argues for an interpretation of Iris Murdoch on which her account of moral reasons has Platonic roots, and on which she gives an ontological proof of the reality of the Good. This reading explains the structure of Sovereignty, how Murdoch's claims differ from a focus on "thick moral concepts," and how to find coherent arguments in her book.
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311Cognitivism about Instrumental ReasonEthics 117 (4): 649-673. 2007.Argues for a "cognitivist" account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.
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167Hume on practical reasonPhilosophical Perspectives 18 (1). 2004.Argues that Hume was a sceptic about practical reason only on a rationalist account of what it would have to be. (This version differs substantially from the published paper.).
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77Wrong-Making ReasonsIn Simon Kirchin (ed.), Reading Parfit, Routledge. pp. 123-134. 2017.Argues that there is a problem of redundancy for Kantian Contractualism in light of plausible claims about the reason-giving force of wrong-making facts.
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337Reasons and CausesEuropean Journal of Philosophy 19 (1): 129-157. 2011.Argues for a causal-psychological account of acting for reasons. This view is distinguished from a more ambitious causal theory of action, clarified as far as possible, and motivated—against non-reductive, teleological, and behaviourist alternatives—on broadly metaphysical grounds
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44Review of Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, eds., 'Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge' (review)Mind 118 (472): 834-840. 2009.
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390Knowledge of intentionIn Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. pp. 170--197. 2011.Argues that it is not by inference from intention that I know what I am doing intentionally. Instead, the reverse is true: groundless knowledge of intention rests on the will as a capacity for non-perceptual, non-inferential knowledge of action. The argument adapts and clarifies considerations of "transparency" more familiar in connection with belief.
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173Intention, Plans, and Ethical RationalismIn Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman, Oxford University Press. pp. 56-82. 2014.Argues from the planning theory of intention – as an account of means-end coherence – to a comprehensive form of ethical rationalism. Having raised objections to this result, the paper ends by sketching a way out.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |