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113Holding One’s OwnArgumentation 22 (4): 571-584. 2008.There is a tension with regard to regulative norms of inquiry. One’s commitments must survive critical scrutiny, and if they do not survive, they should be revised. Alternately, for views to be adequately articulated and defended, their proponents must maintain a strong commitment to the views in question. A solution is proposed with the notion of holding one’s own as the virtue of being reason-responsive with the prospects of improving the view in question.
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428Tu Quoque Arguments and the Significance of HypocrisyInformal Logic 28 (2): 155-169. 2008.Though textbook tu quoque arguments are fallacies of relevance, many versions of arguments from hypocrisy are indirectly relevant to the issue. Some arguments from hypocrisy are challenges to the authority of a speaker on the basis of either her sincerity or competency regarding the issue. Other arguments from hypocrisy purport to be evidence of the impracticability of the opponent’s proposals. Further, some versions of hypocrisy charges from impracticability are open to a counter that I will te…Read more
Nashville, Tennessee, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Epistemology |
| Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
| American Pragmatism |
| Informal Logic |