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Scott Aikin

Vanderbilt University
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  • Vanderbilt University
    Department of Philosophy
    Associate Professor
Homepage
Nashville, Tennessee, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
American Pragmatism
Informal Logic
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Religion
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
American Pragmatism
Informal Logic
  • All publications (182)
  •  87
    In the space of reasons: Selected essays of Wilfrid Sellars (review) (review)
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (2). 2008.
    Wilfrid SellarsCharles Sanders Peirce
  •  291
    Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?
    Philosophical Studies 126 (2): 191-217. 2005.
    What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: conceptual arguments from incompleteness, conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of "infinitism" consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.
    Epistemic RegressOught Implies CanInfinitism
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