•  59
    Modest (but not Self-Effacing) Transcendental Arguments
    Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (1): 69-79. 2015.
  •  149
    Prospects for A Levinasian Epistemic Infinitism
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (3): 437-460. 2012.
    Abstract Epistemic infinitism is certainly not a majority view in contemporary epistemology. While there are some examples of infinitism in the history of philosophy, more work needs to be done mining this history in order to provide a richer understanding of how infinitism might be formulated internal to different philosophical frameworks. Accordingly, we argue that the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas can be read as operating according to an ?impure? model of epistemic infinitism. The infinite o…Read more
  •  947
    A Consistency Challenge for Moral and Religious Beliefs
    Teaching Philosophy 32 (2): 127-151. 2009.
    What should individuals do when their firmly held moral beliefs are prima facie inconsistent with their religious beliefs? In this article weoutline several ways of posing such consistency challenges and offer a detailed taxonomy of the various responses available to someone facing a consistency challenge of this sort. Throughout the paper, our concerns are primarily pedagogical: how best to pose consistency challenges in the classroom, how to stimulate discussion of the various responses to the…Read more
  •  88
    In the space of reasons: Selected essays of Wilfrid Sellars (review) (review)
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (2). 2008.
  •  299
    Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?
    Philosophical Studies 126 (2): 191-217. 2005.
    What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: conceptual arguments from incompleteness, conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of "infinitism" consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.