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66Democratic Deliberation, Public Reason, and Environmental PoliticsEnvironmental Philosophy 3 (2): 52-58. 2006.The activity of democratic deliberation is governed by the norm of public reason – namely, that reasons justifying public policy must both be pursuant of shared goods and be shareable by all reasonable discussants. Environmental policies based on controversial theories of value, as a consequence, are in danger of breaking the rule that would legitimate their enforcement.
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1322Prospects for Peircean Epistemic InfinitismContemporary Pragmatism 6 (2): 71-87. 2009.Epistemic infinitism is the view that infinite series of inferential relations are productive of epistemic justification. Peirce is explicitly infinitist in his early work, namely his 1868 series of articles. Further, Peirce's semiotic categories of firsts, seconds, and thirds favors a mixed theory of justification. The conclusion is that Peirce was an infinitist, and particularly, what I will term an impure infinitist. However, the prospects for Peirce's infinitism depend entirely on the prospe…Read more
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165The Rhetorical Theory of Argument is Self-DefeatingCogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 3 (1). 2011.The rhetorical theory of argument, if held as a conclusion of an argument, is self-defeating. The rhetorical theory can be refined, but these refinements either make the theory subject to a second self- defeat problem or tacitly an epistemic theory of argument
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162Meta-epistemology and the varieties of epistemic infinitismSynthese 163 (2): 175-185. 2008.I will assume here the defenses of epistemic infinitism are adequate and inquire as to the variety standpoints within the view. I will argue that infinitism has three varieties depending on the strength of demandingness of the infinitist requirement and the purity of its conception of epistemic justification, each of which I will term strong pure, strong impure, and weak impure infinitisms. Further, I will argue that impure infinitisms have the dialectical advantage.
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27Xenophanes the High Rationalist: The Case of F1:17-8Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (1): 1-14. 2014.Scholarship on Xenophanes’s F1 has had two foci, one on the rules of the symposium and the other on the religious program posed at its close. Thus far, the two areas of focus have been treated as either separate issues or as the religious program proposed in the service of the sympotic objectives. Instead, I will argue that the sympotic norms Xenophanes espouses are in the service of the broader program of rational theology
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58Holding One’s OwnArgumentation 22 (4): 571-584. 2008.There is a tension with regard to regulative norms of inquiry. One’s commitments must survive critical scrutiny, and if they do not survive, they should be revised. Alternately, for views to be adequately articulated and defended, their proponents must maintain a strong commitment to the views in question. A solution is proposed with the notion of holding one’s own as the virtue of being reason-responsive with the prospects of improving the view in question
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528The Problem of the Criterion and Hegel's Model for Epistemic InfinitismHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (4). 2010.
Nashville, Tennessee, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Epistemology |
| Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
| American Pragmatism |
| Informal Logic |