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1Collective Intentions, Commitment, and Collective Action ProblemsIn Fabienne Peter & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Rationality and Commitment, Oxford University Press. pp. 258. 2007.
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2799Belief, Acceptance, and What Happens in Groups: Some Methodological ConsiderationsIn Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2014.This paper argues for a methodological point that bears on a relatively long-standing debate concerning collective beliefs in the sense elaborated by Margaret Gilbert: are they cases of belief or rather of acceptance? It is argued that epistemological accounts and distinctions developed in individual epistemology on the basis of considering the individual case are not necessarily applicable to the collective case or, more generally, uncritically to be adopted in collective epistemology.
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156Remarks on collective beliefIn Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 235-56. 1994.The author develops and elaborates on her account of collective belief, something standardly referred to, in her view, when we speak of what we believe. This paper focuses on a special response hearers may experience in the context of expressions of belief, a response that may issue in offended rebukes to the speaker. It is argued that this response would be appropriate if both speakers and hearers were parties to what the authors calls a joint commitment to believe a certain proposition as a bo…Read more
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363Obligation and Joint CommitmentUtilitas 11 (2): 143. 1999.I argue that obligations of an important type inhere in what I call 'joint commitments'. I propose a joint commitment account of everyday agreements. This could explain why some philosophers believe that we know of the obligating nature of agreements a priori. I compare and contrast obligations of joint commitment with obligations in the relatively narrow sense recommended by H. L. A. Hart, a recommendation that has been influential. Some central contexts in which Hart takes there to be obligati…Read more
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169Collective preferences, obligations, and rational choiceEconomics and Philosophy 17 (1): 109-119. 2001.Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in some way reducible to the personal preferences of their members? In short, are collective preferences possible? In everyday life people speak easily of what we prefer, where what is at issue seems to be a collective preference. This is suggested by the acceptability of such remarks as ‘My ideal walk would be . . . along rougher and less well-marked paths than we prefer as a family’. One can imagine, ind…Read more
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95Can a Wise Society Be a Free One?Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1): 151-167. 2006.This article invokes the idea of a wise society, something that has received little attention from contemporary philosophers. It argues that, given plausible interpretations of the relevant terms, the wiser a society is, the less free it is. Even if one prefers a different account of a wise society, the argument in question is significant, for on this account a wise society possesses features that would seem to be desirable whatever their relationship to wisdom in particular: it makes many true …Read more
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437Who's to blame? Collective moral responsibility and its implications for group membersMidwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1). 2006.No abstract available
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517Shared intention and personal intentionsPhilosophical Studies 144 (1). 2009.This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intent…Read more
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99Rationality and saliencePhilosophical Studies 57 (1): 61-77. 1989.A number of authors, Including Thomas Schelling and David Lewis, have envisaged a model of the generation of action in coordination problems in which salience plays a crucial role. Empirical studies suggest that human subjects are likely to try for the salient combination of actions, a tendency leading to fortunate results. Does rationality dictate that one aim at the salient combination? Some have thought so, Thus proclaiming that salience is all that is needed to resolve coordination problems …Read more
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67In search of socialityPhilosophical Explorations 1 (3). 1998.This paper reviews some of the growing body of work in the analytic philosophy of social phenomena, with special reference to the question whether adequate accounts of particular social phenomena can be given in terms that are individualistic in a sense that is specified. The discussion focusses on accounts of what have come to be known as shared intention and action. There is also some consideration of accounts of social convention and collective belief. Particular attention is paid to the need…Read more
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110Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social RealityRowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2003.Socializing Metaphysics supplies diverse answers to the basic questions of social metaphysics, from a broad array of voices. It will interest all philosophers and social scientists concerned with mind, action, or the foundations of social theory.
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123Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social PhenomenaAnalyse & Kritik 30 (2): 483-514. 2008.Drawing on earlier work of the author that is both clarified and amplified here, this article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In short, what is it for people to share an intention? It argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people s…Read more
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132Reconsidering the “actual contract” theory of political obligationEthics 109 (2): 236-260. 1999.Do people have obligations by virtue of the fact that a given country is their country? Actual contract theory says they do because they have agreed to act in certain ways. Contemporary philosophers standardly object in terms of the 'no agreement' objection and the 'not morally binding' objection. I argue that the 'not morally binding' objection is not conclusive. As for the 'no agreement' objection, though actual contract theory succumbs, a closely related plural subject theory of political obl…Read more
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30Some psychologists argue that in general we self-ascribe characteristics according to others' perceived reactions to us. In illustration michael argyle cites a case involving the self-Ascription of popularity. But popularity is what I here call a 'reaction-Determined characteristic, That is, A characteristic such that certain others' reacting to someone in a certain way is logically sufficient for his having it. The general import of cases involving such characteristics needs careful examination…Read more
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218Group Membership and Political ObligationThe Monist 76 (1): 119-131. 1993.This is how A. John Simmons sets the scene for his discussion of political obligation in his book Moral Principles and Political Obligations, one of the best known contemporary philosophical treatments of the subject.
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100Character, Essence, Action: Considerations on Character Traits after SartreThe Pluralist 1 (1). 2006.Two radically different, general accounts of human character traits - the "essentialist" and the "summary" accounts - are given critical consideration. The former account is characterized in terms of Saul Kripke's conception of metaphysical essence. Both accounts are discussed with reference to Jean-Paul Sartre's treatment of character traits. The essentialist account cannot withstand considerations relating to personal identity over time. The summary account is also rejected, as is a certain ki…Read more
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Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Law |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Philosophy of Social Science |