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401How to think about mental qualitiesPhilosophical Issues 20 (1): 368-393. 2010.It’s often held that undetectable inversion of mental qualities is, if not possible, at least conceivable. It’s thought to be conceivable that the mental quality your visual states exhibit when you see something red in standard conditions is literally of the same type as the mental quality my visual states exhibit when I see something green in such circumstances. It’s thought, moreover, to be conceivable that such inversion of mental qualities could be wholly undetectable by any third-person mea…Read more
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264State consciousness and transitive consciousnessConsciousness and Cognition 2 (3): 355-63. 1994.
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152Being conscious of ourselvesThe Monist 87 (2): 161-184. 2004.What is it that we are conscious of when we are conscious of ourselves? Hume famously despaired of finding self, as against simply finding various impressions and ideas, when, as he put it, “I enter most intimately into what I call myself.” “When I turn my reflexion on myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions.”
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1Reductionism and knowledgeIn L. S. Cauman, Isaac Levi, Charles D. Parsons & Robert Schwartz (eds.), How Many Questions?, Hacket. 1983.
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514The Higher-Order Model of ConsciousnessIn Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 2002.All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
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20Unity Of Consciousness And The SelfProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3): 325-352. 2003.
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507Consciousness, the self and bodily locationAnalysis 70 (2): 270-276. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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Perceptual and cognitive models of consciousnessJournal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 45. 1997.
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19The modularity and maturation of cognitive capacitiesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 32-34. 1980.
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CUNY Graduate CenterDepartment of Philosophy
Cognitive Science
Linguistics
Cognitive NeuroscienceProfessor
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Language |
Cognitive Sciences |