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135PowerPoint presentation at Tucson VII, Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006, session on Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.
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30
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401How to think about mental qualitiesPhilosophical Issues 20 (1): 368-393. 2010.It’s often held that undetectable inversion of mental qualities is, if not possible, at least conceivable. It’s thought to be conceivable that the mental quality your visual states exhibit when you see something red in standard conditions is literally of the same type as the mental quality my visual states exhibit when I see something green in such circumstances. It’s thought, moreover, to be conceivable that such inversion of mental qualities could be wholly undetectable by any third-person mea…Read more
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264State consciousness and transitive consciousnessConsciousness and Cognition 2 (3): 355-63. 1994.
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152Being conscious of ourselvesThe Monist 87 (2): 161-184. 2004.What is it that we are conscious of when we are conscious of ourselves? Hume famously despaired of finding self, as against simply finding various impressions and ideas, when, as he put it, “I enter most intimately into what I call myself.” “When I turn my reflexion on myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions.”
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20Unity Of Consciousness And The SelfProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3): 325-352. 2003.
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1Reductionism and knowledgeIn L. S. Cauman, Isaac Levi, Charles D. Parsons & Robert Schwartz (eds.), How Many Questions?, Hacket. 1983.
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514The Higher-Order Model of ConsciousnessIn Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 2002.All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
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19The modularity and maturation of cognitive capacitiesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 32-34. 1980.
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506Consciousness, the self and bodily locationAnalysis 70 (2): 270-276. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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Perceptual and cognitive models of consciousnessJournal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 45. 1997.
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150Consciousness and the mindJerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (July): 227-251. 2002.Everyone — or almost everyone — was agreed that what is [mental] … has a common quality in which its essence is expressed: namely the quality of being conscious — unique, indescribable, but needing no description. All that is conscious … is [mental], and conversely all that is [mental] is conscious; that is self-evident and to contradict it is nonsense
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139Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem (edited book)Prentice-Hall. 1971.An expanded and updated edition of this classic collection
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729Two concepts of consciousnessPhilosophical Studies 49 (May): 329-59. 1986.No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way of looking at things, if any mental sta…Read more
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688Concepts and definitions of consciousnessIn P. W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness, Elsevierin Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009
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441How many kinds of consciousness?Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4): 653-665. 2002.Ned BlockÕs influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and acce…Read more
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155(not intended for publication), Replies to Strawson and Block in Colloquium at the CUNY Graduate Center, December 13, 2006.
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198The main goal of Deborah Modrak's penetrating and compelling discussion is to show that Aristotle subscribed "to an integrated model of perceptual and noetic functions" (268). Using Aristotle's phrase (Γ4, 429b13, 21), Modrak describes the integrated model as the view that "the noetic faculty is the perceptual faculty differently disposed" (283). She notes that this interpretation faces certain difficulties, but argues forcefully and incisively that it can nonetheless be sustained.
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3Thinking that one thinksIn Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Blackwell. 1993.
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119Explaining ConsciousnessIn David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press. pp. 109-131. 2002.
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1Persons, minds, and consciousnessIn R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. pp. 199-220. 2002.
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513One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is conscious when it's awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it's unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse.
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6The identity theoryIn Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 1994.In Descartes's time the issue between materialists and their opponents was framed in terms of substances. Materialists such as Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Gassendi maintained that people are physical systems with abilities that no other physical systems have; people, therefore, are special kinds of physical substance. Descartes's DUALISM, by contrast, claimed that people consist of two distinct substances that interact causally: a physical body and a nonphysical, unextended substance. The tradition…Read more
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48Content, interpretation, and consciousnessProtoSociology 14 67-84. 2000.According to Dennett, the facts about consciousness are wholly fixed by the effects consciousness has on other things. But if a mental state's being conscious consists in one's having a higher-order thought about that state, we will in principle have an independent way to fix those facts. Dennett also holds that our speech acts sometimes determine what our thoughts are, since speech acts often outrun in content the thoughts they express.I argue that what thoughts we have is independent of how we…Read more
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CUNY Graduate CenterDepartment of Philosophy
Cognitive Science
Linguistics
Cognitive NeuroscienceProfessor
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Language |
Cognitive Sciences |