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297Phenomenal consciousness and what it's likeBehavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1): 156--57. 1997.be realized. Whatever gets access to phenomenal awareness is represented within this absent together
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192Awareness and Identification of SelfIn JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays, . 2011.
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112The Nature of Mind (edited book)Oxford University Press. 1991.This anthology brings together readings mainly from contemporary philosophers, but also from writers of the past two centuries, on the philosophy of mind. Some of the main questions addressed are: is a human being really a mind in relation to a body; if so, what exactly is this mind and how it is related to the body; and are there any grounds for supposing that the mind survives the disintegration of the body?
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179Experience and the physicalJournal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 117-28. 2006.Strawson’s challenging and provocative defence of panpsychism1 begins by sensibly insisting that physicalism, properly understood, must unflinchingly countenance the occurrence of conscious experiences. No view, he urges, will count as ‘real physicalism’ (p. 4) if it seeks to get around or soften that commitment, as versions of socalled physicalism sometimes do. Real physicalism (hereinafter physicalism tout court) must accordingly reject any stark opposition of mental and physical, which is not…Read more
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140Multiple drafts and higher-order thoughts (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 911-18. 1993.whatever it is that occurs in between the two. Though superficially tempting, this idea heightens the air of mystery surrounding consciousness. As far..
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220Consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgmentsConsciousness and Cognition 9 (2): 203-214. 2000.Because metacognition consists in our having mental access to our cognitive states and mental states are conscious only when we are conscious of them in some suitable way, metacognition and consciousness shed important theoretical light on one another. Thus, our having metacognitive access to information carried by states that are not conscious helps con?rm the hypothesis that a mental state
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1Sensory qualities, consciousness, and perceptionIn Consciousness and Mind, Clarendon Press. pp. 175-226. 2005.
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289MS, under submission, derived from a Powerpoint presentation at a Conference on Consciousness, Memory, and Perception, in honor of Larry Weiskrantz, City University, London, September 15, 2006.
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93Addendum to introductionIn Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, Hackett. 2000.Mind-body materialism is at its most inviting in the context of trying to give a unified treatment of the natural world. And the principle challenge it faces is to do justice to the distinguishing features of mental phenomena, which set them off from nonmental, physical reality. This challenge it not easy to meet. In 1971 I suggested that the difficulty in meeting it makes especially appealing the eliminative materialism of Feyerabend and Rorty. If adopting the materialist view that mental pheno…Read more
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CUNY Graduate CenterDepartment of Philosophy
Cognitive Science
Linguistics
Cognitive NeuroscienceProfessor
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Language |
Cognitive Sciences |