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23XV-Unity of Consciousness and the SelfProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1): 325-352. 2003.
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21There is much in Bridgeman's account that I find congenial and compelling, especially appealing is Bridgeman's application of his thesis to the tie between consciousness and language. Nonetheless, I want to raise some questions about whether the tie he finds between plans and consciousness actually does hold. Not all memory and attention is conscious. Although attention and accessing of memories are required to execute plans, we need not be at all conscious of the relevant states of memory and a…Read more
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20Unity Of Consciousness And The SelfProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3): 325-352. 2003.
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19The modularity and maturation of cognitive capacitiesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 32-34. 1980.
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16Being Conscious of OurselvesThe Monist 87 (2): 159-181. 2004.What is it that we are conscious of when we are conscious of ourselves? Hume famously despaired of finding self, as against simply finding various impressions and ideas, when, as he put it, “I enter most intimately into what I call myself.” “When I turn my reflexion on myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions.”
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15A theory of consciousnessIn Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, Mit Press. 1997.
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14Methodological behaviorism: a case for transparent texonomyBehavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 92-93. 1980.
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12The insignificance of incommensurate variationsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3): 364-364. 1978.
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6The identity theoryIn Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 1994.In Descartes's time the issue between materialists and their opponents was framed in terms of substances. Materialists such as Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Gassendi maintained that people are physical systems with abilities that no other physical systems have; people, therefore, are special kinds of physical substance. Descartes's DUALISM, by contrast, claimed that people consist of two distinct substances that interact causally: a physical body and a nonphysical, unextended substance. The tradition…Read more
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4DualismIn Edward Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge. 1998.Dualism is the view that mental phenomena are, in some respect, nonphysical. The best-known version is due to Descartes, and holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance. Descartes argued that, because minds have no spatial properties and physical reality is essentially extended in space, minds are wholly nonphysical. Every human being is accordingly a composite of two objects: a physical body, and a nonphysical object that is that human being's mind. On a weaker version of dualism, which cont…Read more
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3Thinking that one thinksIn Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Blackwell. 1993.
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2Review of Jackson's P erception: A representative theory (review)Journal of Philosophy 82 (1): 28--41. 1985.
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2Emotions and the selfIn K. Irani & Gerald E. Myers (eds.), Emotion: Philosophical Studies, Haven. 1983.Much of the perplexity that motivates modern discussion of the nature of mind derives indirectly from the striking success of physical explanation. Not only has physics itself advanced at a remarkable pace in the last four centuries; every hope has been held out that, in principle, all science can be understood and ultimately studied in terms of mechanisms proper to physics. Seeing all natural phenomena as explicable in terms appropriate to physics, however, makes the mental seem to be a singula…Read more
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2Descartes's Meditations: Critical Essays (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1997.This collection of recent articles by leading scholars is designed to illuminate one of the greatest and most influential philosophical books of all time. It includes incisive commentary on every major theme and argument in the Meditations, and will be valuable not only to philosophers but to historians, theologians, literary scholars, and interested general readers
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1Reductionism and knowledgeIn L. S. Cauman, Isaac Levi, Charles D. Parsons & Robert Schwartz (eds.), How Many Questions?, Hacket. 1983.
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1IIn Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2017.What is the relation between mind and physical reality? Well‐established schools of thought give starkly opposing answers to this question. Descartes insisted that mental phenomena are non‐physical in nature. This view seems inviting because mental phenomena are indisputably different from everything else. Moreover, it's safe to assume that all phenomena that aren't mental have some physical nature. So it may seem that the best way to explain how the mental differs from everything else is to hyp…Read more
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1Persons, minds, and consciousnessIn R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. pp. 199-220. 2002.
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1Consciousness and metacognitionIn Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, Oxford University Press. 1998.
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CUNY Graduate CenterDepartment of Philosophy
Cognitive Science
Linguistics
Cognitive NeuroscienceProfessor
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Language |
Cognitive Sciences |