Joel Smith

The stated aim of Shaun Gallagher’s book is to provide, “an account of embodiment that is sufficiently detailed, and that is articulated in a vocabulary that can integrate discussions across the cognitive sciences...to remap the terrain that lies between phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience” (10). With this in mind, the book must be considered a success. The book provides a unified account of embodiment, and its relations to a number of aspects of experience, that is genuinely accessible from the perspectives of the philosophy of mind, phenomenology, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. The book is divided into two parts. The first presents an admirably lucid account of the different ways in which embodiment informs and structures experience. The second attempts to “extend the results of the scientific and phenomenological studies developed in the first part into various philosophical problem areas that border on the cognitive sciences.” (12). A large amount of the material that appears here has appeared, in some form or other, before. This is perhaps partly responsible for the feel, especially in the second part of the book, that we are being given a collection of essays on a loosely connected theme. However, this does not detract from its philosophical and scientific significance, and there is genuine value in having this impressive body of work to hand in a single book. It must be said that some chapters are more successful (for example, chapters 5 and 7 on gesture and on Molyneux’s Problem respectively) than others (for example, chapters 6 and 10 on perception and free will respectively), and some of them appear rather well distanced from the general picture of embodiment presented in the first part of the book (for example, chapter 9 on other minds). It also has to be admitted that the book’s primary strength, the vast and interdisciplinary range of resources under its command, occasionally becomes a weakness. This happens in chapter 8 where we are promised an exploration of, “a variety of issues that pertain to the structure of self-awareness and the capacity for self-reference...[demonstrating] just how complex and fragile these phenomena are.” (173). Yet what we get is an account of how thought insertion is explained by deficiencies in the temporal structure of experience. Whilst this is fascinating in its own right, and does speak, to a certain extent, to issues concerning self-awareness, the vexed issue of self-reference is not even mentioned again. Minor gripes aside, this book contains such an incredible wealth of information and argumentation that it must surely be considered required reading for anyone working on embodiment, embodied cognition and the philosophy of mind more generally.