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Revisability and the a PrioriDissertation, Brown University. 2000.I argue in favor of the possibility of real a priori justification. Some writers have claimed that, to adequately defend against the naturalist, we should grant that a priori justification can be defeated by further experiential evidence. Such writers generally view a priori faculties as on a par with empirical faculties but with different proper objects. While perceptual objects are the contingently existing things with which we are in causal contact, a priori objects are either necessarily tru…Read more
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43Infinitism and Practical Conditions on JustificationLogos and Episteme 2 (2): 191-209. 2011.This paper brings together two recent developments in the theory of epistemic justification: practical conditions on justification, and infinitism (the view thatjustification is a matter of having an infinite series of non-repeating reasons). Pragmatic principles can be used to argue that, if we’re looking for an ‘objective’ theory of the structure of justification – a theory that applies to all subjects independently of their practical context – infinitism stands the only chance at being the co…Read more
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208Critical study of John Hawthorne's knowledge and lotteries and Jason Stanley's knowledge and practical interests (review)Noûs 43 (1): 178-192. 2009.No Abstract
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185Mary Shepherd on Causal NecessityMetaphysica 17 (1): 87-108. 2016.Lady Mary Shepherd’s critique of Hume’s account of causation, his worries about knowledge of matters of fact, and the contention that it is possible for the course of nature to spontaneously change relies primarily on three premises, two of which – that objects are merely bundles of qualities and that the qualities of an object are individuated by the causal powers contributed by those qualities – anticipate contemporary metaphysical views in ways that she should be getting credit for. The remai…Read more
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297Knowledge in an uncertain worldOxford University Press. 2009.Introduction -- Fallibilism -- Contextualism -- Knowledge and reasons -- Justification -- Belief -- The value and importance of knowledge -- Infallibilism or pragmatic encroachment? -- Appendix I: Conflicts with bayesian decision theory? -- Appendix II: Does KJ entail infallibilism?
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1218Evidence, pragmatics, and justificationPhilosophical Review 111 (1): 67-94. 2002.Evidentialism is the thesis that epistemic justification for belief supervenes on evidential support. However, we claim there are cases in which, even though two subjects have the same evidential support for a proposition, only one of them is justified. What make the difference are pragmatic factors, factors having to do with our cares and concerns. Our argument against evidentialism is not based on intuitions about particular cases. Rather, we aim to provide a theoretical basis for rejectin…Read more
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251Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to workPhilosophical Studies 142 (1): 55-66. 2009.We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chanc…Read more
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126Truth and EpistemologyIn John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, Springer. pp. 127--145. 2013.In Sect. 1 of this chapter, Matthew McGrath examines Sosa's work on the nature of truth. Sosa's chief purpose is to determine what sort of theory of truth is appropriate for truth-centered epistemology -- an epistemology that takes truth to be the goal of inquiry and which explains key epistemic notions in terms of truth. While Sosa refutes arguments from Putnam and Davidson against the correspondence theory, he is hesitant to endorse it because he doubts we have a clear enough grasp of what cor…Read more
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214Is metaethics morally neutral?Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1). 2006.I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non-moral properties are at stake. The argument…Read more
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4DM Armstrong, CB Martin and UT Place, Dispositions: A Debate Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 17 (2): 80-82. 1997.
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177An analysis of the a priori and a posterioriActa Analytica 18 (1-2): 43-69. 2003.I present and defend a unified, non-reductive analysis of the a priori and a posteriori. It is a mistake to remove all epistemic conditions from the analysis of the a priori (as, for example, Alvin Goldman has recently suggested doing). We can keep epistemic conditions (like unrevisability) in the analysis as long as we insist that a priori and a posteriori justification admit of degrees. I recommend making the degree to which a beliefâs justification is a priori or a posteriori solely depende…Read more
Calgary, Alberta, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Social Epistemology |
Epistemic Fallibilism |
Epistemological Theories |
Areas of Interest
Social Epistemology |