•  155
    What exactly is logical pluralism?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2). 2002.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  63
    Reasonable Doubt: A Note on Neutral Illatives and Arguments
    Argumentation 13 (3): 243-250. 1999.
    George Bowles and Thomas Gilbert claim that illatives such as so, therefore, and hence convey the meaning that the premise confers upon the conclusion a probability greater than 1/2. This claim is false, for there are straightforward uses of these illatives that do not convey the meaning that the probability is greater than 1/2. In addition, because Bowles' and Gilbert's claim is false, a revision of their definition of argument is required
  •  141
    Exemplification and Argument
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3): 235-254. 2012.
    Suppose you doubt that rationally persuasive arguments can have just premises that are obviously false. But now consider:(X) Grass is red. Some arguments have merely obviously false premises.'Grass is red' is the only premise and is obviously false, so (X) should convince you that there are arguments with merely obviously false premises. On the face of it, there is nothing irrational about being so convinced by (X). But then (X) is a rationally persuasive argument with merely obviously false pre…Read more
  •  161
    A useful time machine
    Philosophy 77 (2): 281-282. 2002.
    Robert Casati and Achille C. Varzi, argue that time machines would be useless or have no practical applications on the grounds that travelling to the past would involve doing what has already been done. I argue that the sense in which travelling to the past involves doing what has already been done fails to support the claim that time machines would have no practical applications.
  •  57
    In recent discussions concerning the definition of argument, it has been maintained that the word ‘argument’ exhibits the process-product ambiguity, or an act/object ambi-guity. Drawing on literature on lexical ambiguity we argue that ‘argument’ is not ambiguous. The term ‘argument’ refers to an object, not to a speech act. We also examine some of the important implications of our argument by considering the question: what sort of abstract objects are arguments?
  •  102
    The Nature of Time By Ulrich Meyer
    Analysis 75 (1): 167-169. 2015.
  •  166
    Logic, Truth and Inquiry
    Informal Logic 33 (3): 462-469. 2013.
    by Mark Weinstein King’s College London, UK: College Publications, 2013. Pp. viii, 1-232. Softcover. ISBN-13: 978-1-84890-100-1, ISBN-10: 1848901003. US$ 17.00