G. C. Goddu

One popular test for distinguishing linked and convergent argument structures is Robert Yanal's Ordinary Summing Test. Douglas Walton, in his comprehensive survey of possible candidates for the linked/convergent distinction, advocates a particular version of Yanal's test. In a recent article, Alexander Tyaglo proposes to generalize and verifY Yanal's algorithm for convergent arguments, the basis for Yanal's Ordinary Summing Test. In this paper I will argue that Yanal's ordinary summing equation does not demarcate convergence and so his Ordinary Summing Test fails. Hence, despite Walton's recommendation or Tyaglo's generalization, the Ordinary Summing Test should not be used for distinguishing linked argument structures from convergent argument structures

In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is”, Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that neither is adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real” arguments, for the articulation fails to pick out a stable proper subclass of all arguments that is simultaneously both theoretically relevant and a proper subclass of all arguments.

In this paper I argue that the debate over the purported distinction between deductive and inductive arguments can be bypassed because making the distinction is unnecessary for successfully evaluating arguments. I provide a foundation for doing logic that makes no appeal to the distinction and still performs all the relevant tasks required of an analysis of arguments. I also reply to objections to the view that we can dispense with the distinction. Finally, I conclude that the distinction between inductive and deductive arguments is not one of the most important and fundamental ideas in logic, but rather is unnecessary

Suppose you doubt that rationally persuasive arguments can have just premises that are obviously false. But now consider:(X) Grass is red. Some arguments have merely obviously false premises.'Grass is red' is the only premise and is obviously false, so (X) should convince you that there are arguments with merely obviously false premises. On the face of it, there is nothing irrational about being so convinced by (X). But then (X) is a rationally persuasive argument with merely obviously false premises.A cheap trick you say? Not so, say I — a trick yes, but, I shall argue, far from cheap. In ' 'P, Therefore, P' Without Circularity,' Roy Sorensen uses numerous examples like these to suggest, among other things ..