•  16
    Intentional Identity and Reporting the Beliefs of Others
    Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst. 1996.
    This work analyzes Peter Geach's problem of intentional identity, viz. adequately formalizing the sentence "Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow" and other sentences like it. First, Geach's problem is presented, and then Geach's original formalization proposals, and his own reasons for rejecting them, are presented and discussed. Next, the solutions proposed by various philosophers and linguists are presented and analyzed in detail. All are show…Read more
  •  15
    Reasonable Doubt: A Note on Neutral Illatives and Arguments
    Argumentation 13 (3): 243-250. 1999.
    George Bowles and Thomas Gilbert claim that illatives such as so, therefore, and hence convey the meaning that the premise confers upon the conclusion a probability greater than 1/2. This claim is false, for there are straightforward uses of these illatives that do not convey the meaning that the probability is greater than 1/2. In addition, because Bowles' and Gilbert's claim is false, a revision of their definition of argument is required
  •  12
    Many defenders of the possibility of time travel into the past also hold that such time travel places no restrictions on what said time travelers can do. Some hold that it places at least a few restrictions on what time travelers can do. In attempting to resolve this dispute, I reached a contrary conclusion. Time travelers to the past cannot do other than what they in fact do. Using a very weak notion of can, I shall argue that the correspondingly strong cannot do otherwise applies in the case o…Read more
  •  11
    A Simple Theory of Argument Schemes
    Informal Logic 42 (3): 539-578. 2021.
    While there has been in depth discussion of many particular argumentation schemes, some lament that there is little to no theory underpinning the notion of an argumentation scheme. Here I shall argue against the utility of argument schemes, at least as a fundamental part of a complete theory of arguments. I shall also present and defend a minimalist theory of their nature—a scheme is just a set of proposition expressions and propositional functions. While simple, the theory contravenes several t…Read more
  •  2
    The Reach of Abduction: Insight and Trial (review)
    Informal Logic 25 (3): 289-294. 2005.