Tomas Hribek

[Materialism and Hylomorphism] The author disputes the view, expressed recently by Tomáš Machula a David Peroutka, that materialism, dominant in contemporary philosophy of mind, should be substituted by Thomist hylomorphism. The critique focuses on two aspects of Machula and Peroutka’s argument. Firstly, on their assumption that the contemporary preference for materialism is the result of chance (ignorance of the fact that in addition to materialism and dualism the position of hylomorphism is also available). This assumption fails to take into account the fact that dualism was already the subject of criticism in the 17th century, but materialism only became properly established in the mid-twentieth century. Secondly, the author argues that Thomist hylomorphism can be updated in a more fruitful way than that proposed by Machula and Peroutka. This updating requires us, however, to sacrifice certain metaphysically unsustainable ideas – in particular the idea that the soul is a non-material substance independent of the body.

[Davidson on Externalism] This is a critical analysis of Davidson's version of psychological externalism. The author argues that Davidson offers two different types of the theory, which do not coincide, however, with the usual distinction between physical and social externalism. On the one hand, Davidson argues that the mental states of an individual are determined by her causal history (what could be called "historical externalism"); on the other hand, he argues that each individual's mental states are determined by her interactions with other people (or what might be dubbed "interactionist externalism"). The author contends that these two externalisms are mutually not quite consistent, and that Davidson's arguments for them are inconclusive.

This paper starts from the familiar premise that psychological anti-individualism is incompatible with materialism. It attempts to state more clearly what this incompatibility consists in, and — rather than arguing in detail for any particular resolution — to inquire whether this incompatibility admits any resolution. However, the paper does offer a conditional argument concerning the possibility that the incompatibility is genuine and cannot be resolved. Provided that anti-individualism and materialism cannot be squared, and anti-individualism is correct, it follows that materialism has to be abandoned. If so, the situation is not as disastrous as it might at first seem. We need not, in consequence of our inability to construe a coherent metaphysics of mind, give up on intentional vocabulary any more than we must stop, in consequence of our inability to make sense of induction, anticipating the future

[How is Irrationality Possible? Davidson and the Split Mind] The paper deals witht Davidson's response to the challenge posed to his theory of mind by the phenomena of irrationality. This challenge is especially acute for Davidson, since he famously argued that it is a necessary condition on intentional agency that the agent be largely rational. The author begins by defending Davidson against some recent critics of perfect rationality. The middle part of the paper is an explication of Davidson's own theory of irrationality, usually ignored by his critics. Somewhat similar to Freud, Davidson posits a split within the mind -- though not between conscious and subconscious parts, but rather between the mental states that are related to others as reasons and those that are mere causes. The final part of the paper critiques this proposal.

[For an Ethics without Theology] This study is a critical reflection on Marek Vácha's article on the ethics of euthanasia. In the first part the author offers a short consideration of the reasons for the moribund state of ethics in Czech philosophy, after which, in the second part, he presents a critique of Vácha's article. The article in question is, above all, lacking in a philosophical approach to the problem of euthanasia, and we find in it not so much arguments as rhetoric. The only line of argument that is detectable in the article is founded on natural theology, something that Vácha elsewhere repudiates, and it offers the reader a false dilemma between accepting theistic ethics on the one hand or total subjectivism on the other. In reality, of course, there is a wide range of kinds of objective secular ethics. In the third part, one of these forms is summarised--a system of "everyday morality" which is founded on the concept of harm, and which treats conduct as immoral primarily when it causes unjustifiable harm to others. This form of ethics does not presuppose any controversial theory of value, and it constitutes the viewpoint from which the author then defends physician-assisted suicide. A doctor who helps a patient die--or who causes the patient's death on his own request--does not cause that individual harm if she has only a period of life filled with pain left. In conclusion the author indentifies certain points of contact between secular and theistic ethics.