Lode Lauwaert

Millions of users now engage in sexual and romantic interactions with AI chatbots, from dedicated companion platforms such as Replika, Ourdream.ai and Character.AI to general-purpose large language models such as ChatGPT, whose developers have recently discussed permitting erotic content for verified adults. These developments constitute what McArthur ( 2022 ) terms second-wave sextech, in which the artefact itself becomes the focal point of sexual engagement. Contemporary philosophical debate on second-wave sexual technologies is organized around three dominant positions: instrumentalist, abolitionist feminist, and polysemic. Each is primarily concerned with the ethical permissibility of their design and use. We argue that all three share a significant shortcoming: they fail to address the conceptual pressure that AI-mediated sexual technologies exert on established categories within the traditional philosophy of sexuality and on everyday concepts people use to make sense of their sexual subjectivity, activities and relations. Current philosophical discussions neglect the question of how these technologies may require us to revise such notions as sexual activity, sexual partnership, intentionality, objectification, and the ontological status of technologically mediated sexual experience. This neglect arises from an insufficient appreciation of the co-constitutive relationship between sexual technologies and the concepts through which we understand sexuality. Drawing on a work in conceptual engineering and techno-moral change, we demonstrate that earlier sexual technologies have already occasioned substantial conceptual and normative shifts, and that the current proliferation of AI-mediated sexual interactions is likely to intensify them. The paper advances two claims: that philosophical inquiry into AI-mediated sexual technologies must engage the broader tradition in the philosophy of sexuality, particularly regarding the ontology of sexual acts and sexual subjectivity; and that an empirically informed approach, drawing on experimental philosophy and established empirical disciplines, is warranted to investigate how these technologies reshape broader conceptualizations surrounding sexuality.

AI is developing rapidly, as are concerns about the environmental impact of its training and deployment. Studies about the environmental sustainability of AI have begun to emerge in the past five years, stressing the need for critical reflection on the discursive underbelly of this emerging scholarship. For example, how do authors frame the problem of the environmental impact of AI? Are there any ethical reflections accompanying their reporting, and if so, which ethical theories and principles guide normative considerations about the environmental impact of AI? In this study, we conduct a scoping literature review on (1) how authors refer to and frame the problem of the environmental impact of AI systems, (2) who is ascribed responsibility for mitigating said impact, (3) what mitigative measures are proposed, and (4) what normative commitments justify such prescriptive normative statements. Our findings indicate that most literature on the topic is concentrated in computer science, engineering, and natural sciences, and the humanities are mostly absent. This results in a dominance of technofix attitudes towards the problem, and a narrow and limited engagement with ethical principles and theories. As such, we argue for more interdisciplinary work on the environmental sustainability of AI, leading to more diverse solutions and more explicit and pluralistic ethical starting points, grounded, for example, in relational and more-than-human ethics. The findings of this review highlight gaps in the literature and opportunities for developers, social scientists, and AI ethicists for more effective and diverse responses to AI’s environmental impact.

The complex issue of fake news has been approached extensively by many disciplines in academia. Despite this variety of approaches, the concept of fake news still lacks a reasonable degree of definitional unicity. This paper critically analyzes a sample of definitions from the current literature. By diving into the set of definitions, there will exhibited a total of ten necessary conditions that scholars generally consider: imitation, falsity, deception, bullshit, purpose, morality, assessability, virality, channel, and appeal. Current definitions of fake news have certain blindspots and leave too much leeway for interpretation. This leeway is utterly problematic because it creates a grey zone in which articles are left stranded halfway between fake news and factual news articles. However, it has the crucial advantage of opening up new epistemic paths of inquiry regarding fake news. As a conclusion, we will summarize the conditions one can accept or reject to define fake news.

The AI Ethics literature has identified many forms of harm caused, perpetuated or exacerbated by artificial intelligence (AI). One, however, has been overlooked. In this paper we argue that the increasing use of AI heightens the risk of ‘hermeneutic harm’, which occurs when people are unable to make sense of, or come to terms with, unexpected, unwelcome, or harmful events they experience. We develop several examples to support our argument that AI increases the risk of hermeneutic harm. Importantly, our argument makes no assumption of flawed design, biased training data, or misuse: hermeneutic harm can occur regardless. Explainable AI (XAI) could plausibly reduce the risk of hermeneutic harm in some cases. Thus, one respect in which this paper advances the field is that it shows the need to further broaden XAI’s understanding of the social function of explanation. Yet XAI cannot fully mitigate the risk of hermeneutic harm, which (as our choice of examples shows) would persist even if all ‘black-box’ problems of system opacity were to be solved. The paper thus highlights an important but underexplored risk posed by AI systems.

Concerns about artificial intelligence (AI) and its potential existential risks have garnered significant attention, with figures like Geoffrey Hinton and Dennis Hassabis advocating for robust safeguards against catastrophic outcomes. Prominent scholars, such as Nick Bostrom and Max Tegmark, have further advanced the discourse by exploring the long-term impacts of superintelligent AI. However, this existential risk narrative faces criticism, particularly in popular media, where scholars like Timnit Gebru, Melanie Mitchell, and Nick Clegg argue, among other things, that it distracts from pressing current issues. Despite extensive media coverage, skepticism toward the existential risk discourse has received limited rigorous treatment in academic literature. Addressing this imbalance, this paper reconstructs and evaluates three common arguments against the existential risk perspective: the Distraction Argument, the Argument from Human Frailty, and the Checkpoints for Intervention Argument. By systematically reconstructing and assessing these arguments, the paper aims to provide a foundation for more balanced academic discourse and further research on AI.

Concerns about artificial intelligence (AI) and its potential existential risks have garnered significant attention, with figures like Geoffrey Hinton and Dennis Hassabis advocating for robust safeguards against catastrophic outcomes. Prominent scholars, such as Nick Bostrom and Max Tegmark, have further advanced the discourse by exploring the long-term impacts of superintelligent AI. However, this existential risk narrative faces criticism, particularly in popular media, where scholars like Timnit Gebru, Melanie Mitchell, and Nick Clegg argue, among other things, that it distracts from pressing current issues. Despite extensive media coverage, skepticism toward the existential risk discourse has received limited rigorous treatment in academic literature. Addressing this imbalance, this paper reconstructs and evaluates three common arguments against the existential risk perspective: the Distraction Argument, the Argument from Human Frailty, and the Checkpoints for Intervention Argument. By systematically reconstructing and assessing these arguments, the paper aims to provide a foundation for more balanced academic discourse and further research on AI.

In an interview for Playboy in 1969, media scientist Marshall McLuhan, known for, among other things, the expression that the medium is the message, claimed that computers will be able to orchestrate the lives of many people in the near future. Machines, the Canadian thinker said, will be able to take over the main media channels, write messages themselves, and distribute them to the population. Meanwhile, we know that McLuhan’s prediction was not complete nonsense—think of Microsoft’s chatbot TAY (the acronym stands for Thinking About You) that sent sexist and racist messages into the world via Twitter in March 2006. At the time, however, interviewer Eric Norden was somewhat impressed by what McLuhan was claiming. He asked if we as humanity will still have control over technology. Or, Norden queried, will technology control humanity? McLuhan replied as follows: “I see no possibility of a worldwide Luddite rebellion that will smash all machinery to bits, so we might as well sit back and see what is happening and what will happen to us in a cybernetic world. Resenting a new technology will not halt its progress.” (Norden, 1969).

The First Industrial Revolution relied on steam, the Second on electricity, and the Third on computers and the internet. For several years now, we have been in a new revolution. This has a lot to do with what the internet provided us with: data, big data, actually an awful lot of data about an awful lot of things from our online and offline lives. To give you an idea: it is said that 90% of the data available to us today was generated in the last 5 years. ‘Data is the new oil’ has been the cliché since 2006, when mathematician Clive Humby first used the phrase. And the USA is the new Saudi Arabia. What systems are being fueled with data?

Both philosophers and non-philosophers often have the impression that the concept of violence has an essence, that is, one or more properties that are characteristic of all violence and only violence. In this chapter, it is shown that characteristics of damage, morally wrong and intention cannot be the essence. The conclusion is that we need to understand our notion of violence in the same way as Wittgenstein understood the concept of play and family. That insight is not only of philosophical importance but also of non-philosophical relevance.

A number of scholars and policy-makers have raised serious concerns about the impact of chatbots and generative artificial intelligence (AI) on the spread of political disinformation. An increasingly popular proposal to address this concern is to pass laws that, by requiring that artificially generated and artificially disseminated content be labeled as such, aim to ensure a degree of transparency in this rapidly transforming environment. This article argues that such laws are misguided, for two reasons. We first aim to show that legally requiring the disclosure of the automated nature of bot accounts and AI-generated content is unlikely to succeed in improving the quality of political discussion on social media. This is because information that an account spreading or creating political information is a bot or a language model is itself politically relevant information, and people reason very poorly about such information. Second, we aim to show that the main motivation for these laws – the threat of coordinated disinformation campaigns (automated or not) – appears overstated.

A number of scholars and policy-makers have raised serious concerns about the impact of chatbots and generative artificial intelligence (AI) on the spread of political disinformation. An increasingly popular proposal to address this concern is to pass laws that, by requiring that artificially generated and artificially disseminated content be labeled as such, aim to ensure a degree of transparency in this rapidly transforming environment. This article argues that such laws are misguided, for two reasons. We first aim to show that legally requiring the disclosure of the automated nature of bot accounts and AI-generated content is unlikely to succeed in improving the quality of political discussion on social media. This is because information that an account spreading or creating political information is a bot or a language model is itself politically relevant information, and people reason very poorly about such information. Second, we aim to show that the main motivation for these laws – the threat of coordinated disinformation campaigns (automated or not) – appears overstated.

When is AI environmentally just? In recent years, increasing attention has been drawn to the environmental impact of AI. Particularly, the development and training of AI systems require significant amounts of energy, water, and raw materials. This raises new ethical questions, such as: when is it (un)justifiable to develop an AI system, considering its environmental impact? This question has been scarcely addressed in the academic literature. To tackle this question, this article draws from the literature on environmental and energy justice. In that field, three categories of justice are distinguished, referring to three elements that can be unjust: the distribution of benefits and burdens (distributive justice), decision-making procedures (procedural justice), and institutionalized social norms (justice as recognition). Based on these distinctions, we outline the criteria for determining the ethical admissibility of AI, given its ecological impact.

The complex issue of fake news has been approached extensively by many disciplines in academia. Despite this variety of approaches, the concept of fake news still lacks a reasonable degree of definitional unicity. This paper critically analyzes a sample of definitions from the current literature. By diving into the set of definitions, it will exhibited a total of ten necessary conditions that scholars generally consider: imitation, falsity, deception, bullshit, purpose, morality, assessability, virality, channel, and appeal. Current definitions of fake news have certain blindspots and leave too much leeway for interpretation. This leeway is utterly problematic because it creates a grey zone in which articles are left stranded halfway between fake news and factual news articles. However, it has the crucial advantage of opening up new epistemic paths of inquiry regarding fake news. As a conclusion, we will summarize the conditions one can accept or reject to define fake news.

Since its emergence in the 1960s, Artifcial Intelligence (AI) has grown to conquer many technology products and their felds of application. Machine learning, as a major part of the current AI solutions, can learn from the data and through experience to reach high performance on various tasks. This growing success of AI algorithms has led to a need for interpretability to understand opaque models such as deep neural networks. Various requirements have been raised from diferent domains, together with numerous tools to debug, justify outcomes, and establish the safety, fairness and reliability of the models. This variety of tasks has led to inconsistencies in the terminology with, for instance, terms such as interpretable, explainable and transparent being often used interchangeably in methodology papers. These words, however, convey diferent meanings and are “weighted" diferently across domains, for example in the technical and social sciences. In this paper, we propose an overarching terminology of interpretability of AI systems that can be referred to by the technical developers as much as by the social sciences community to pursue clarity and efciency in the defnition of regulations for ethical and reliable AI development. We show how our taxonomy and defnition of interpretable AI difer from the ones in previous research and how they apply with high versatility to several domains and use cases, proposing a—highly needed—standard for the communication among interdisciplinary areas of AI.

Digital privacy scholars tend to bemoan ordinary people’s limited knowledge of and lukewarm interest in what happens to their digital data. This general lack of interest and knowledge is often taken as a consideration in favor of legislation aiming to force internet companies into adopting more responsible data practices. While we remain silent on whether any new laws are called for, in this paper we wish to underline a neglected consequence of people’s ignorance of and apathy for digital privacy: their potential to encourage capture by industry interests. In particular, we argue that such laws may be at increased risk of capture because they are unlikely to be democratically responsive. We make this claim on a twofold basis: first, well-known theoretical mechanisms explaining how the absence of responsiveness leads to capture, identified in prior political science and political philosophy literature, yield the prediction that digital privacy legislation is likely to be unresponsive and thus captured; second, empirical data concerning the European Union’s digital privacy laws, with a special focus on the General Data Protection Regulation, appears to confirm these predictions: the bloc’s (world’s?) flagship privacy protection law seems more responsive to corporate than citizen interests.

Digital privacy scholars tend to bemoan ordinary people’s limited knowledge of and lukewarm interest in what happens to their digital data. This general lack of interest and knowledge is often taken as a consideration in favor of legislation aiming to force internet companies into adopting more responsible data practices. While we remain silent on whether any new laws are called for, in this paper we wish to underline a neglected consequence of people’s ignorance of and apathy for digital privacy: their potential to encourage capture by industry interests. In particular, we argue that such laws may be at increased risk of capture because they are unlikely to be democratically responsive. We make this claim on a twofold basis: first, well-known theoretical mechanisms explaining how the absence of responsiveness leads to capture, identified in prior political science and political philosophy literature, yield the prediction that digital privacy legislation is likely to be unresponsive and thus captured; second, empirical data concerning the European Union’s digital privacy laws, with a special focus on the General Data Protection Regulation, appears to confirm these predictions: the bloc’s (world’s?) flagship privacy protection law seems more responsive to corporate than citizen interests.

Technologie is (bijna) zo oud als de mens en bepaalt al eeuwenlang mee ons bestaan. Met de komst van intelligente machines raakt die wisselwerking tussen mens en machine in een stroomversnelling. Drones, algoritmes van Spotify en zelfrijdende wagens zijn vandaag zo alomtegenwoordig dat ze vragen oproepen over de menselijke natuur, en hoezeer wij worden bepaald en bedreigd door technologie. Zijn robots waardegeladen of waardevrij? Waarin verschilt Mark Zuckerberg van Martin Heidegger? En is het effectief zo dat technologie onze samenleving aanstuurt, of is het de mens die de richting bepaalt? In een glasheldere stijl ontrafelt Lode Lauwaert al deze vragen. Het resultaat is een frisse en kritische blik op de thema's van deze tijd."--Publisher information.

This paper argues, against the prevailing view, that consent to privacy policies that regular internet users usually give is largely unproblematic from the moral point of view. To substantiate this claim, we rely on the idea of the right not to know (RNTK), as developed by bioethicists. Defenders of the RNTK in bioethical literature on informed consent claim that patients generally have the right to refuse medically relevant information. In this article we extend the application of the RNTK to online privacy. We then argue that if internet users can be thought of as exercising their RNTK before consenting to privacy policies, their consent ought to be considered free of the standard charges leveled against it by critics.

This paper argues, against the prevailing view, that consent to privacy policies that regular internet users usually give is largely unproblematic from the moral point of view. To substantiate this claim, we rely on the idea of the right not to know (RNTK), as developed by bioethicists. Defenders of the RNTK in bioethical literature on informed consent claim that patients generally have the right to refuse medically relevant information. In this article we extend the application of the RNTK to online privacy. We then argue that if internet users can be thought of as exercising their RNTK before consenting to privacy policies, their consent ought to be considered free of the standard charges leveled against it by critics.

This edited collection explores the problem of violence from the vantage point of meaning. Taking up the ambiguity of the word ‘meaning’, the chapters analyse the manner in which violence affects and in some cases constitutes the meaningful structure of our lifeworld, on individual, social, religious and conceptual levels. The relationship between violence and meaning is multifaceted, and is thus investigated from a variety of different perspectives within the continental tradition of philosophy, including phenomenology, post-structuralism, critical theory and psychoanalysis. Divided into four parts, the volume explores diverging meanings of the concept of violence, as well as transcendent or religious violence- a form of violence that takes place between humanity and the divine world. Going on to investigate instances of immanent and secular violence, which occur at the level of the group, community or society, the book concludes with an exploration of violence and meaning on the individual level: violence at the level of the self, or between particular persons. With its focus on the manifold of relations between violence and meaning, as well as its four part focus on conceptual, transcendent, immanent and individual violence, the book is both multi-directional and multi-layered.

This paper is dedicated to a discussion of Gilles Deleuze’s Coldness and Cruelty and its special place in French Sade studies. In this text, Deleuze famously argues against the notion of ‘sadomasochism’ as a unity. Sadism and masochism are, on his view, two entirely separate and incompatible ways of making use of pain and suffering in perversion. What is less known about Deleuze’s text is that he argues, against the current in French philosophy, psychiatry, and even intuition, that the essence of sadism is a kind of thinking rather than a pleasure in causing pain to others. In this essay, we try to make sense of the idea that the sadist, at heart, is a metaphysician who thinks by means of suffering and indifference. Our paper also addresses the related concern about how to account for the properly sexual nature of this metaphysical perversion. We argue that the sexuality of thinking is rooted in pre-genital sexual life as described by Freud in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.

De invloed van het denken van Paul Moyaert is zeer groot. Daarom wil 'Orde scheppen' hulde brengen aan deze filosoof en zijn intellectuele bezetenheid. De thematische diversiteit van het boek weerspiegelt de biodiversiteit van Moyaerts eigen werk, die met enig geweld tot drie grote thema's of domeinen kan worden herleid: wijsgerige antropologie, psychopathologie en religie. Onderwerpen zijn: het symbolische, de liefde, uchronie, de echtheid van beelden, en poëzie; de afstemming bij jongvolwassenen met een meervoudige handicap, homoseksualiteit bij vrouwelijke adolescenten, en Kant en Foucault; en ten slotte de hardnekkigheid van religie, christelijke ascese, de vele gezichten van Kierkegaard, Franciscus van Assisi, en de oorlogsdagboeken van Hans Keilson.

It is commonly accepted that technology and society have always been intertwined. The question is rather how we should understand that relation. This introduction to the special issue ‘Technology and Society’ gives a brief overview of the history of the questions related to this intertwinement. The special issue consists of six essays, emanating from presentations at the 2019 conference on Technology and Society at the Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven. It was organized by the Working Group on Philosophy of Technology, whose aim is to promote philosophy of technology at the KU Leuven, but also more broadly in Belgium.

In the debate on whether to ban LAWS, moral arguments are mainly used. One of these arguments, proposed by Sparrow, is that the use of LAWS goes hand in hand with the responsibility gap. Together with the premise that the ability to hold someone responsible is a necessary condition for the admissibility of an act, Sparrow believes that this leads to the conclusion that LAWS should be prohibited. In this article, it will be shown that Sparrow’s argumentation for both premises is not convincing. If one interprets the thesis that responsibility (first premise) is necessary in a descriptive sense, this assertion clashes with military theory and practice. And even if you focus on the normative interpretation, that claim does not stand. The second premise for Sparrow’s conclusion, namely that you cannot hold anyone responsible for LAWS’ (mis)deeds, is based on the idea that control is a necessary condition for responsibility. It will be shown that this idea too is not correct, which means that Sparrow’s control argument does not do the work it should do. From this, we can conclude that Sparrow’s justification for his claim that LAWS should be banned is insufficient, and neither can we conclude that the thesis of a responsibility gap has in any case been undermined. However, it will also be argued that someone may be responsible for the actions of LAWS, or that it cannot be excluded that one can be held responsible.

Artificial intelligence and normative ethics: Who is responsible for the crime of LAWS? In his text “Killer Robots”, Robert Sparrow holds that killer robots should be forbidden. This conclusion is based on two premises. The first is that attributive responsibility is a necessary condition for admitting an action; the second premise is that the use of killer robots is accompanied by a responsibility gap. Although there are good reasons to conclude that killer robots should be banned, the article shows that Sparrow's argument for the ban is not correct.

The literary oeuvre of Marquis de Sade (1740–1814) has attracted a great deal of interest over the past 200 years, not only from writers, but also from numerous leading philosophers. Among them is Georges Bataille, who particularly emphasizes the apathetic character of the Sadean libertines, meaning that they feel nothing at all. More specifically, the French philosopher focuses on their apathetic enjoyment that goes hand in hand with the abuse of victims. The goal of this article is to clarify that peculiar pleasure by comparing it, among other things, with stoicism and mysticism. It will be shown that in the Sadean universe not moral transgression is central, but rather the transgression of a metaphysical boundary, i.e. the boundary between the human and non-human.