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Catherine Elisabeth Hundleby

University of Windsor
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  •  270
    Aggression, Politeness, and Abstract Adversaries
    Informal Logic 33 (2): 238-262. 2013.
    Trudy Govier argues in The Philosophy of Argument that adversariality in argumentation can be kept to a necessary minimum. On her ac-count, politeness can limit the ancillary adversariality of hostile culture but a degree of logical opposition will remain part of argumentation, and perhaps all reasoning. Argumentation cannot be purified by politeness in the way she hopes, nor does reasoning even in the discursive context of argumentation demand opposition. Such hopes assume an idealized politene…Read more
    Informal Logic
  •  138
    The open end: Social naturalism, feminist values and the integrity of epistemology
    Social Epistemology 16 (3). 2002.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Feminist EpistemologySocial Epistemology, MiscellaneousIntegrity
  •  41
    Silence and the Limitations of Contextual Objectivity
  •  67
    Fallacy Forward: Situating fallacy theory
    Ossa Conference Archive. 2009.
    I will situate the fallacies approach to reasoning with the aim of making it more relevant to contemporary life and thus intellectually significant and valuable as a method for teaching reasoning. This entails a revision that will relegate some of the traditional fallacies to the realm of history and introduce more recently recognized problems in reasoning. Some newly recognized problems that demand attention are revealed by contemporary science studies, which reveal at least two tenacious probl…Read more
    Informal Logic
  •  53
    Authority arguments in academic contexts in social studies and humanities
    with Begona Carrascal
    Ossa Conference Archive. 2011.
    In academic contexts the appeal to authority is a quite common but seldom tested argument, either because we accept the authority without questioning it, or because we look for alternative experts or reasons to support a different point of view. But, by putting ourselves side by side an already accepted authority, we often rhetorically manoeuvre to displace the burden of the proof to avoid the fear to present our opinions and to allow face saving.
  •  75
    The Epistemological Evaluation of Oppositional Secrets
    Hypatia 20 (4): 44-58. 2005.
    Although political values guide people who take advice from standpoint epistemolo-gies in deciding whether to reveal secrets used to resist oppression, these decisions can also be understood and evaluated in purely cognitive or epistemological terms. When political considerations direct us to preserve a secret, the cognitive value progressively diminishes because the view of the world projected by the secret is increasingly vulnerable.
    Feminist Social EpistemologyFeminism: OppressionTopics in Feminist Philosophy, Misc