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494Advice for Non-analytical NaturalistsIn Simon Kirchin (ed.), Reading Parfit, Routledge. pp. 153-171. 2017.We argue that Parfit's "Triviality Objection" against some naturalistic views of normativity is not compelling. We think that once one accepts, as one should, that identity statements can be informative in virtue of their pragmatics and not only in virtue of their semantics, Parfit's case against naturalism can be overcome.
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156Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon’s Rationalistic Moral PsychologySocial Theory and Practice 28 (2): 243-76. 2002.
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66Sumner on WelfareDialogue 37 (3): 571-. 1998.In this paper I criticize the way Sumner marks the subjective/objective divide and the way he argues for subjective views of well-being.
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |