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91Horwich, meaning and Kripke's WittgensteinPhilosophical Quarterly 50 (199): 161-174. 2000.Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'us…Read more
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146Horwich, Meaning and Kripke’s WittgensteinPhilosophical Quarterly 50 (199): 161-174. 2000.Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'us…Read more
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113Best opinion, intention-detecting and analytic functionalismPhilosophical Quarterly 44 (175): 239-245. 1994.
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79Arithmaetical platonism: Reliability and judgement-dependencePhilosophical Studies 95 (3): 277-310. 1999.
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81Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to NelsonAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2): 337-341. 2009.In chapter 8 of Miller 2003, I argued against the idea that Jackson and Pettit's notion of program explanation might help Sturgeon's non-reductive naturalist version of moral realism respond to the explanatory challenge posed by Harman. In a recent paper in the AJP[Nelson 2006, Mark Nelson has attempted to defend the idea that program explanation might prove useful to Sturgeon in replying to Harman. In this note, I suggest that Nelson's argument fails
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Ch. 21. The development of theories on meaning : from Frege to McDowell and beyondIn Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of The History of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2013.
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14Philosophy of LanguageRoutledge. 1998.This engaging and accessible introduction to the philosophy of language provides an important guide to one of the liveliest and most challenging areas of study in philosophy. Interweaving the historical development of the subject with a thematic overview of the different approaches to meaning, the book provides students with the tools necessary to understand contemporary analytical philosophy
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The normativity of meaning and contentIn Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge University Press. 2021.
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The normativity of meaning and contentIn Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge University Press. 2021.
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16Philosophy of LanguageRoutledge. 1998.This engaging and accessible introduction to the philosophy of language provides an important guide to one of the liveliest and most challenging areas of study in philosophy. Interweaving the historical development of the subject with a thematic overview of the different approaches to meaning, the book provides students with the tools necessary to understand contemporary analytical philosophy. The second edition includes new material on: Chomsky, Wittgenstein and Davidson as well as new chapters…Read more
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14Logic, Language, and Mathematics: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2020.Crispin Wright is widely recognised as one of the most important and influential analytic philosophers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This volume is a collective exploration of the major themes of his work in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mathematics. It comprises specially written chapters by a group of internationally renowned thinkers, as well as four substantial responses from Wright. In these thematically organized replies, Wright summarizes hi…Read more
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43Philosophy of LanguageMcgill-Queen's University Press. 1998.Starting with Gottlob Frege's foundational theories of sense and reference, Miller provides a useful introduction to the formal logic used in all subsequent philosophy of language. He communicates a sense of active philosophical debate by confronting the views of the early theorists concerned with building systematic theories - such as Frege, Bertrand Russell, and the logical positivists - with the attacks mounted by sceptics - such as W.O. Quine, Saul Kripke, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This leads…Read more
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209Contemporary Metaethics: An IntroductionPolity. 2013.This new edition of Alexander Miller’s highly readable introduction to contemporary metaethics provides a critical overview of the main arguments and themes in twentieth- and twenty-first-century contemporary metaethics. Miller traces the development of contemporary debates in metaethics from their beginnings in the work of G. E. Moore up to the most recent arguments between naturalism and non-naturalism, cognitivism and non-cognitivism. From Moore’s attack on ethical naturalism, A. J. Ayer’s em…Read more
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102Mind Doesn’t Matter YetAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2): 220-28. 1994.This Article does not have an abstract
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40Davidson’s antirealism?Revista de Filosofia Aurora 27 (40): 265. 2015.Frederic Stoutland (1982a, 1982b) has argued that a Davidsonian theory of meaning is incompatible with a realist view of truth, on which the truth-conditions of sentences consist of mind-independent states of affairs or concatenations of extra-linguistic objects. In this paper we show that Stoutland’s argument is a failure.
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311What is the Sceptical Solution?Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (2). 2020.In chapter 3 of Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke’s Wittgenstein offers a “sceptical solution" to the sceptical paradox about meaning developed in chapter 2 (according to which there are no facts in virtue of which ascriptions of meaning such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” can be true). Although many commentators have taken the sceptical solution to be broadly analogous to non-factualist theories in other domains, such as non-cognitivism or expressivism in metaethics, the natu…Read more
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Helen Steward, The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and StatesInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (2): 266-269. 1999.
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15Representation and Reality in Wittegstein's Tractatus (review)Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268): 642-645. 2017.
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21Objective ContentSupplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1): 73-90. 2003.Paul Boghossian has argued, on grounds concerning the holistic nature of belief fixation, that there are principled reasons for thinking that 'optimal conditions' versions of reductive dispositionalism about content cannot hope to satisfy a condition of extensional accuracy. I discern three separable strands of argument in Boghossian's work—the circularity objection, the open-endedness objection, and the certification objection—and argue that each of these objections fails. My conclusion is that…Read more
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6VI*—Emotivism and the Verification PrincipleProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1): 103-124. 1998.Alexander Miller; VI*—Emotivism and the Verification Principle, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 98, Issue 1, 1 June 1998, Pages 103–124, https:/
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6Closet Dualism and Mental CausationCanadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (2): 161-181. 1998.Serious doubts about nonreductive materialism — the orthodoxy of the past two decades in philosophy of mind — have been long overdue. Jaegwon Kim has done perhaps the most to articulate the metaphysical problems that the new breed of materialists must confront in reconciling their physicalism with their commitment to the autonomy of the mental. Although the difficulties confronting supervenience, multiple-realizability, and mental causation have been recurring themes in his work, only mental cau…Read more