-
111Jazz Redux: a reply to MöllerPhilosophical Studies 170 (2): 303-316. 2014.This paper is a response to Niklas Möller’s (Philosophical Studies, 2013) recent criticism of our relational (Jazz) model of meaning of thin evaluative terms. Möller’s criticism rests on a confusion about the role of coordinating intentions in Jazz. This paper clarifies what’s distinctive and controversial about the Jazz proposal and explains why Jazz, unlike traditional accounts of meaning, is not committed to analycities
-
112Moral ExpertiseAnalyse & Kritik 34 (2): 217-230. 2012.This paper surveys recent work on moral expertise. Much of that work defends an asymmetry thesis according to which the cognitive deference to expertise that characterizes other areas of inquiry is out of place in morality. There are two reasons why you might think asymmetry holds. The problem might lie in the existence of expertise or in deferring to it. We argue that both types of arguments for asymmetry fail. They appear to be stronger than they are because of their focus on moral expertise r…Read more
-
Un kantisme orthodoxe est-il viable en éthique?Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Theologie 52 (1-2): 216-236. 2005.
-
117Reasons as right-makersPhilosophical Explorations 12 (3): 279-296. 2009.This paper sketches a right-maker account of normative practical reasons along functionalist lines. The approach is contrasted with other similar accounts, in particular John Broome's analysis of reasons as explanations of oughts
-
120Endorsement and Autonomous AgencyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3): 633-659. 2004.We take self‐governance or autonomy to be a central feature of human agency: we believe that our actions normally occur under our guidance and at our command. A common criticism of the standard theory of action is that it leaves the agent out of his actions and thus mischaracterizes our autonomy. According to proponents of the endorsement model of autonomy, such as Harry Frankfurt and David Velleman, the standard theory simply needs to be supplemented with the agent's actual endorsement of his a…Read more
-
31Kants Theorie der formalen Bestimmung des WillensZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 47 (3). 1993.
-
114A slim semantics for thin moral terms?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2). 2003.This paper is a critique of Ralph Wedgwood's recent attempt to use the framework of conceptual role semantics in metaethics. Wedgwood's central idea is that the action-guiding role of moral terms suffices to determine genuine properties as their semantic values. We argue that Wedgwood cannot get so much for so little. We explore two interpretations of Wedgwood's account of what it takes to be competent with a thin moral term. On the first interpretation, the account does not warrant the assignme…Read more
-
15Wieviele moralische Wahrheiten gibt es?Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 37 (92): 83-104. 2008.
-
34Review: Die psychologische Basis von Freiheit und Verantwortung. Neuere Literatur (review)Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 59 (4). 2005.